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ABSTRACT 
This is a complex argument about the history of transformations in value through the rise 
of modern liberalism. I argue that there are several contradictions that emerge from these trans-
formations. I argue that these contradictions emerge as double effects of liberalism, in tension 
with the project of liberalism and thriving in spite of it. My data are the theories of Thomas 
Hobbes and the interpretations of his work. Hobbes is a good datum for the project because he is 
representative of several of these transformations in value due to the time when and concepts 
with which he writes. I conclude that these transformations have negatively affected the quality 
of our theory and negatively effected our ability to theorize. 
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1. THE FIELD OF BATTLE 
My original purpose for this critique was born from a narrow, reactionary motive. I had 
two simple questions: Was Thomas Hobbes a Christian or was he an atheist; if he were either of 
those things, then why could we not come to some sort of consensus after nearly four hundred 
years? I was displeased with the answers that I could find, which were generally that Hobbes hid 
his atheism because he feared being burnt at the stake. The massive amounts of Hobbesian 
theology were therefore clever artifacts and were not to be taken seriously. 
Worse, the explanation for Hobbes' atheism seemed imprecise, even cartoonish: 
Enlightenment rationalism was the culprit. Religion was said to be relegated, privatized, made an 
issue of personal belief and stripped of its political and ethical authority. Religion died because 
of scientific rationalism. I thought that this account missed the mark. Religion is still a deeply 
enmeshed social phenomenon, which is inextricable from political and ethical practices. 
Furthermore, nearly every Enlightenment philosopher, scientist, historian, poet, and so on, owed 
an enormous debt to the development of Christianity and the philosophy of religion. 
 This debt came in part from the methodology and rigor of the medieval Christian 
theologians; one cannot help but notice the threads of Aquinas' Summa Theologica in Kant's 
Critiques. Furthermore, the debt is also an ethical debt; Enlightenment philosophers inherit the 
moral and political motives of the Christian philosophers who preceded them. To steal a famous 
metaphor, I did not think that the contemporary history of religion appreciated the giant stature 
of those theological shoulders. 
 I was not incorrect in my judgment, but neither incorrect was the history that I had 
thought cartoonish. The fact is that the Enlightenment irrevocably altered not only the social 
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function of religion but also the idea of value in general; however, part of that alteration 
diminished our ability to describe and evaluate the history of values. There are therefore two sets 
of questions involved in the analysis of the Enlightenment and religion. Imposed on us are firstly 
the normal epistemic issues involved in any historical investigation, but there are also the 
epistemic issues of our moral sensibility, which limit and inform the quality of our theory of 
religion. Alasdair MacIntyre’s following statement is a sort of epigraph on this point: 
There are two levels of conflict involved. At one we have to give due recognition to the 
conflicts of the past within and between cultures: Homeric versus Platonic, Judaic versus 
Christian, biblical versus classical, Aristotelian versus Augustinian, the Enlightenment 
versus the Christian, and within each of these antagonisms there is to be found a set of 
subordinate disagreements. 
[…] 
Yet we cannot identify which conflicts in the present reproduce which conflicts of the 
past themselves and we cannot indeed characterize those conflicts of the past themselves 
in a way sufficient to enable us to understand what was and often still is genuinely at 
issue in them until we have confronted another set of conflicts. (MacIntyre, Three 
Versions 229) 
In other words, we have conflicts about the truth of propositions and we also have conflicts about 
the theories and meanings of those propositions. We can therefore disagree about things in 
several different ways. I could accept the propositions of someone's argument while being in 
total opposition to the theory that they use to explain the propositions. 
 The propositional set of conflicts involved is the debate about whether Hobbes is a 
Christian or an atheist. The theoretical and meaningful set of conflicts is in explaining the 
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presence and utility of such an anachronistic and unanswerable question. In order to investigate 
this second set of conflicts, I cannot merely investigate the history of how people have 
interpreted Hobbes; I have also to question the underlying morals in contemporary theory of 
religion that make this issue of the Enlightenment such an important one. The issue is not the 
simple debate over one philosopher’s religious commitments or even of a general period in 
philosophy; the issue requires an assessment of our moral agenda in interpreting the moral 
commitments in the history of religion. 
 The full investigation of these two sets of conflicts would have required an exhaustive 
genealogy of Enlightenment era works and a subsequent genealogy of the interpretations of those 
works. Instead,wWhat follows is my attempt to provide a sort of genealogy for a single, 
representative, philosopher:  I have tried to tell the story of Hobbes' contributions to these several 
kinds of conflicts in the history of value. 
 Hobbes is a good fit for this inquiry for several reasons. The first is that he lived during a 
time when the transformation of ethics through the Enlightenment was just beginning to 
coagulate. Hobbes precedes the conclusion of the genealogy but begins to develop the premises. 
In other words, Hobbes represents one of those first sets of conflicts, specifically how the 
emerging theories of the social contract and the Westphalian state clashed with religious 
institutions for political authority. Hobbes is also a good representative for that second set of 
conflicts, because the way that Hobbes deals with the interaction between religious and state 
authority is not at all obvious and he has been interpreted in a large variety of ways on political 
and theological matters. 
 My investigation of Hobbes' role in the development of axiology has three general 
moments. In the first moment, I consider the question of Hobbes' religion directly. I present the 
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best argument for Hobbes' Christianity, and then I present the best argument for his atheism. The 
point is not to decide whether he is one of those things, but to show that there is no interpretive 
consensus on the point. The question is in a state of aporia. 
 The second moment of my argument is to reproduce the first moment in another area of 
Hobbes' relevance: his politics of absolutism and rebellion. I present an argument for why he is a 
statist. Then I present an argument that Hobbes not only enjoins conditional rebellion, but that he 
implies anarchism. The point of this second investigation is to demonstrate that Hobbes is 
axiologically ambiguous even in issues where he is totally clear about what he believes. In other 
words, the same aporia of Hobbes' religion persists in questions that are settled. 
 The third moment of my argument is to advance a theory that explains what is going on 
in the philosophical disagreements about Hobbes. In other words, it is where I explore the second 
question that motivated my original inquiry: why is it that our value-concepts seem so poorly 
equipped to describe the issues at stake in the moral, religious and political philosophy of 
someone like Thomas Hobbes? To answer this question is partly to describe the transformations 
of value in history and also partly to consider the institutional limitations of the crucibles where 
value is currently produced. 
 What follows is a chapter in the story of the development of value. 
2. WEAPONS FOR ECCLESIA 
Hobbes' religious inclination is a puzzle without a known solution. He is ambiguous, 
alternatively interpreted as a Christian or atheist when the need arises. Philosopher and historian 
Aloysius Martinich identifies two general categories of Hobbes interpreters: “those that give a 
secular interpretation and those that give a religious interpretation. A religious interpretation 
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[holds that God] plays an important part in Hobbes philosophy. A secular interpretation is not a 
religious one” (Martinich, Two Gods 13). This division (secularist and religionist) breaks down 
in the minutiae of Hobbes' interpreters—their motives, their values—but the division is a useful 
one. I will therefore mirror Martinich's terminology and call the former group 'religionists' and 
the latter group 'secularists.' 
 The religionist is historically in the minority of interpreters of Hobbes' work. Even as 
post-modern, anti-essentialism has softened judgments about Hobbes' religion, “the consensus of 
scholarly opinion” now counts Hobbes, at most, as “a tepid theist.” Martinich's view, which he 
expresses extensively in Two Gods of Leviathan, is that “Hobbes was a sincere, and relatively 
orthodox, Christian” (1). Martinich's argument for the religionist interpretation is refreshingly 
simple: “for the most part Hobbes meant what he said” (16). In other words, when Hobbes says 
something of himself, an interpreter should take him at his word unless there is a compelling 
reason not to. Because Hobbes claims Christianity of himself, we should take him at his word 
absent a compelling reason otherwise.1 
 There is a strong prima facie case that Hobbes, as he claims, is a Christian: half of his 
masterwork Leviathan is a theological project. A glance through Leviathan's table of contents 
paints Hobbes as a systematic theologian; he moves from general considerations “On Man” to 
detailed discussions on scripture, angels, prophets, the “kingdom of darknesse” the proper 
“Christian commonwealth” and so on: 
Much of what he wrote presupposes, not merely the existence of God, but the existence 
of the Christian God. The most prominent examples [are] parts III and IV of Leviathan, 
which deal with the full range of theological concepts […] Far from being perfunctory or 
                                                          
1This interpretive maxim seems like a platitude. Nevertheless, Hobbes is not often given that much credit. I will later 
argue that this strange anti-charity is due to Hobbes' historical ambiguity. 
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hackneyed, sarcastic or ironic, his treatments of such issues as the Trinity and the 
Redemption of humankind by Christ are ingenious and novel. It would have been absurd 
for Hobbes to concoct original theories for Christian doctrines if he were not 
intellectually committed to them. (Martinich 27,8) 
Absurd indeed! Unless Hobbes had had some compelling reason to concoct theories about things 
that he thought were total nonsense then the presence of such exhaustive theology makes it 
probable that Hobbes is some sort of Christian. 
 Martinich has placed the burden of proof on the secularist: “I am not denying the 
possibility of a seventeenth-century atheistic philosopher. I am saying that it is unlikely” (40). 
Most people were not atheists in 1640, and there were “virtually no atheistic models of reality” 
for Hobbes to draw on (40). Martinich's view is not the majority interpretation, but it is the most 
parsimonious interpretation because it is the view that Hobbes consistently claims of himself. 
Any case for Hobbes' atheism must be able to answer the prima facie evidence of Hobbes' 
Christianity. We can evaluate the followingcases for Hobbes' Christianity or atheism with this 
question in mind: which among them explains the presence of the overwhelming amount of 
Hobbesian theology the best? 
 I will now survey the various secularist arguments, that is, that Hobbes is an atheist. 
Because Hobbes lived during an ideologically volatile time, we should try to distinguish the 
different arguments that people have used to reach the single conclusion of atheism, lest we 
conflate the different arguments. We can isolate two general camps of secularists. There are the 
secularists of Hobbes' own time and there are the secularists of our own time. I will call the 
former 'period' secularists and the latter 'modern' secularists. 
 Period secularists are generally Christians who think that Hobbes is harming their 
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religion, and they deduce that he is therefore an atheist; contemporary secularists argue that 
Hobbes was clever enough to disguise the truth of atheism in religious language. In other words: 
“[Hobbes'] contemporaries said that he was an atheist as a way of maligning him; our 
contemporaries say it as a way of praising him” (9). Hobbes is an ally to the modern secularist, 
who cheers on the demystification of religion, but he is an enemy to the period secularist, who 
recoils in horror from Hobbes' naturalism. Having isolated the motives for these various 
secularisms, we are in a better position to understand their arguments. 
 Period secularists asperse Hobbes as an atheist to abuse him, as a way of maintaining the 
legitimacy of religious authority: “'Atheist' was only one of a cluster of words used in a similar 
way. 'Heretic,' 'Antichrist,' and 'papist' are three others” (Martinich 21). To call someone an 
'atheist' was to cut the legs off of their claim to religious authority. Martinich gives many 
examples where this political function of the 'atheist' epithet is obvious, but I do not think the 
point is controversial. Sectarian differences in Hobbes' time were “more acrimonious than they 
are in the twentieth century” (32). In seventeenth-century England, your Christianity was likely 
to be made illegal at least once during your life. Accusing someone of atheism rarely considered 
the beliefs of the accused; rather, the accusation was about whether the accused counted as a 
legitimate Christian. 
 There are two different ways to accuse someone of atheism. The first is accusing 
someone of atheism by consequence. The second is accusing someone of atheism by intention. 
To call someone an atheist by consequence is to say that their beliefs entail atheism, whether the 
person believes that or not. To call someone an atheist by intention is to say that they recognize 
themselves as an atheist and argue for atheism. 
 Virtually all period accusations are the first kind: period critics called Hobbes an atheist 
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“not because he aspired to atheism, but because he was advancing a theoretical case for a 
politically charged religious view with which they disagreed. In particular, he was supporting a 
case for the state-controlled Church of England that would be episcopal in polity and Calvinist in 
theology” (33). Calling someone an atheist is to deny a resource to one's enemy, and consider 
how many enemies a statist, politically episcopal, theologically Calvinist philosophy would 
provoke! “He was opposed on the right by Protestant scholastic theologians, who had adapted 
Aristotle to their needs, and on the left by Arminians, who were avowedly anti-Calvinistic” 
(334). I will explore the significance of Hobbes' many enemies later, but the point is that Hobbes' 
composite, unpopular theology in 1651 explains why period secularists might call him an atheist. 
 Such kinds of accusations are not hard to point out in sectarian conflicts in our own time. 
People who share a value-heritage often accuse each other of getting it wrong. In Hobbes' case, 
period secularists are themselves Christians, and their accusations against Hobbes entail a 
theologically normative claim. When Christianity is presupposed as true, the idea that someone 
would by intention argue for atheism appears ludicrous. It should therefore be little wonder that 
period secularists did not care about Hobbes' subjective Christianity when his atheism appeared 
objectively entailed. 
 It is not implausible that Hobbes is some kind of atheist by consequence, especially if his 
project is to “answer the challenge that the new science of Copernicus and Galileo posed for 
religion” (5). It is plausible that trying to use natural science as a theory for the true religion, as 
Hobbes did use it, is a fool's errand doomed to contradiction, but it does not follow that Hobbes' 
attempt is insincere. For example, Hobbes is an ontological materialist, but that position amounts 
to atheism only if God must be immaterial. Hobbes sees no contradiction between ontological 
materialism and the existence of God, angels, or heaven; materialism implies only that God must 
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be material like everything else that exists. Even if this argument is wrong, it points to an error in 
Hobbes' reason rather than in the content of his religion. In light of our earlier guiding 
question—which theory explains the existence of Hobbes' religious arguments the best—the 
theory of the period secularist is plausible, but extremely uninteresting.2 Such arguments do not 
explain why Hobbes would write so much theology and they also require the secularist to 
themselves be a Christian with a theological bone to pick. 
 Contemporary secularists accuse Hobbes of something less plausible but more 
interesting; that is, they accuse him of atheism by intention. There have been several versions of 
this contemporary, secularist position, which range in strength. Martinich engages with three: 
“The most important secularists are Quentin Skinner, David Gauthier, and Edwin Curley” (13). It 
is not my purpose to engage these arguments (not the least reason for which is that Martinich has 
already engaged them.) Rather, I would like to put these arguments through the crucible of 
outlining their commitments and suppositions. By doing so, I hope to boil off their weak 
elements, leaving us to discover the most logically interesting case for Hobbes' atheism. 
 The least interesting of these cases is Gauthier's. His argument is that Hobbes is an atheist 
because Hobbes' theology is superfluous to his political philosophy. In other words, Hobbes' 
treatments of God, angels, etc. are superfluous premises in his argument for political absolutism. 
Martinich replies, “perhaps [religion] is superfluous, but it is fallacious to conclude that Hobbes 
does not rely upon [it]” (44). Everyone should be able to recognize that philosophers sometimes 
believe superfluous things; they are not paragons of parsimony.3 Gauthier's argument is to strip 
                                                          
2An explanation is more logically interesting than another when it accounts for data with minimal amount of factors. 
An explanation is more plausible than another when it is more likely to be the case. We aim for both of these 
attributes in a scientific explanation, but they do not necessarily correspond. Accusing Hobbes of atheism by 
consequence is plausible but not interesting. 
3Some historical examples include epicycles in astronomy, phlogiston, the “climate” theories of race, the theory of 
humours in medicine, and so on. These are not just incorrect theories, but theories that offered comprehensive 
explanations for puzzles that we only retroactively recognize as superfluous to those puzzles. 
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the ore of Hobbes' politics from the dross of his religion, but it requires hindsight in order to 
make it, which Hobbes necessarily did not have. Furthermore, this argument from superfluity 
does not explain why Hobbes writes so much purportedly superfluous theology. 
 The next-more-interesting argument is that Hobbes has an ulterior motive for writing 
theology – trying to appropriate the Christian tradition: “Some may argue that, far from 
presupposing religious beliefs, Parts III and IV of Leviathan are designed to undermine religion 
in a clever way” (Martinich 28). Skinner makes a weak version of this general argument. Skinner 
argues that Hobbes' philosophy is intentionally atheist, but his method is questionable: 
“[Skinner] does not argue from Hobbes' text at all. Rather, he argues that what Hobbes means is 
what his contemporaries interpreted him as meaning” (355). Skinner's argument accounts for the 
prima facie puzzle of Hobbes' theology, namely, that the theology is a trick. The problem with 
Skinner's argument is that he relies on the wrong kind of evidence. If we want to determine 
Hobbes' intentions for religion then we probably need to read things that Hobbes says about 
religion. 
 Curley's argument is more methodologically sound. Martinich credits Curley with 
making “the most sustained and well-wrought case that Hobbes was 'rather likely … an atheist'” 
(339). Curley's method is to examine Hobbes' historical hand-print, that is, what Hobbes says in 
his letters, what historical events conditioned Hobbes' philosophy, what kind of person Hobbes 
was in his biography, and so on. Curley has not, however, put the issue to rest. To illustrate, 
Hobbes was a scathing and unforgiving critic of people who he did not think appreciated the 
consequences of his work; in this vein, he attacked quite a few representatives of the Church and 
had an antagonistic relationship with the institutions of religion. Curley's interpretation is that 
Hobbes betrays his atheism in such attacks despite his extensive theology. It is just as plausible, 
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however, that Hobbes betrays his Christianity in such attacks. If Hobbes were a Christian, his 
religion in conjunction with his arrogance and wit would lead us to expect a public attack on 
religious institutions just as much as if he were an atheist. In other words, Hobbes' psychology 
probably conditioned his publicly acrimonious relationship with religious figures more than his 
theological commitments. 
 In any case, the problem for the secularist is to explain the preponderance of Christian 
data in Hobbes' philosophy, and demonstrating that Hobbes fiercely opposed a lot of religious 
authority does not explain that preponderance. In order to account for all of the data, the 
secularist must not only demonstrate that Hobbes' theology is redundant to his atheist politics, 
but also explain how that theology is insincere, and also explain why the political philosophy 
required a fake theology rather than the rejection of theology. If Hobbes were a closeted atheist, 
he could have easily written no theology, said a few words on religion to hedge his bets, and 
written whatever else he wanted to. 
 Either from respect or condemnation, most attempts to explain Hobbes' theological work 
reduce to ignoring data: “Curley wants to prove that Hobbes is an atheist in order to enhance 
[Hobbes'] reputation as a philosopher, not to condemn him. [Like the Grand Inquisitor] he is 
illegitimately interpreting the speaker to mean the opposite of what he says, merely to get the 
words to fit their interpretation” (Martinich 352). Even if Hobbes' is plausibly an atheist, the 
secularist must explain why Hobbes cannot be some sort of Christian. The secularist must 
explain why Hobbes would consistently lie. The secularist must provide a theory of error to 
account for the prima facie case.4 
                                                          
4By 'theory of error' I do not mean the type of moral skepticism. I mean simply that theories without consensus must 
explain why reasonable people get things wrong. For example, an error theory would address the question, 'if 
Adam were created good, then how could he err?' In this case, the error is to explain how basically reasonable 
people might err in taking Hobbes at his word. 
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 There are three logical possibilities for Hobbes' religion. Hobbes may be a sincere 
Christian who believes contradictory things; he may be a sincere Christian who is right where 
other Christians are wrong; or he may be one of the best manipulators of all time, who is capable 
of bamboozling his readers even today. The secularist must argue the third of these possibilities 
on peril of doing bad science and bad history. 
 Fortunately, the most interesting case for Hobbes' atheism is this last possibility. 
Unfortunately, the last possibility is also the least plausible case. I believe that there is a good 
case for the strong, implausible judgment, but I would first like to show how difficult the 
argument is to make. I have so far argued for Hobbes' Christianity only at the prima facie level. 
Now that I have discovered the conditions of the best case for Hobbes' atheism, I shall briefly 
illustrate the best case for his Christianity. 
 The person who has made the best case for Hobbes' Christianity is Martinich. As he 
moves beyond the prima facie case, Martinich accounts for Hobbes' Christianity in its historical 
situation. There are two claims here: (1) Hobbes is an orthodox Calvinist; and (2) orthodox 
religion faces massive challenges at this time in history. Therefore, Hobbes is a Christian, deeply 
moved by the promise of scientific knowledge, who made enemies by seeking the truth of God in 
the form of science (1-7). Notice, the puzzle is solved. It is clearly explained how Hobbes' 
Christianity was so misconstrued as atheism. The case is compelling, and I encourage unslakable 
readers to read The Two Gods of Leviathan. 
 As I mentioned in the previous section, there are issues of propositional truth and issues 
of theoretical explanation. Martinich argues that Hobbes is chiefly doing theoretical work for a 
Christian ontology: “Various theories have been proposed to support Christian doctrine [….] One 
of Hobbes' chief projects was to create a new theory for Christianity, a theory that would make it 
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compatible with the modern science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey” (7). In other words, 
Hobbes explains the why and the how rather than the that and the whether. 
 Hobbes tends to explain religious facts rather than disputes the facts themselves. We saw 
this already in Hobbes' account of God and materialism. Martinich illustrates idea rather well by 
“exploiting a biblical metaphor:” 
Hobbes thought that the Roman Catholic Church had poured the new wine of Christianity 
into the old skins of Aristotelianism, which were now cracked and leaking doctrine. His 
project was to pour the old wine of biblical Christianity into the new skins of scientific 
theory. (7) 
Hobbes' theory contends Galileo's (unforeseen) challenges to Christianity much as Kant's later 
theory contends Hume's (unforeseen) challenges to the certainty of scientific knowledge. 
 For example, Hobbes attempts to integrate the scientific theory of materialism with the 
theory of knowledge about God. As a materialist and humble theologian, Hobbes held that 
speaking about God was mostly beyond our rights.5 There are three theses to differentiate: (1) 
We can have no idea of God; (2) we can have no knowledge of what God is like; (3) we can have 
no knowledge of God. Hobbes asserts the first two, but believes that we may have some 
knowledge of God without an idea of God. Hobbes is basically within an orthodox theological 
tradition here (Martinich 185). 
 The third thesis is a claim about God's existence; the second thesis is a claim about God's 
essence: “To say that God is infinite is to make an ontological claim. To make the corresponding 
epistemological claim is to say that God is incomprehensible, as Hobbes occasionally does” 
                                                          
5I do not mean legal rights. This is a question of “right” in being logically able to talk about something without 
going beyond the limits of cognition. Kant's transcendental deduction, for example, is about our “right” to make 
claims about the world. In this sense, Hobbes would question our epistemological right to talk about God's 
attributes. 
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(Martinich 191). Few Christian theologians are confident enough to assert that they know how or 
why God does anything, but few will dispute the fact that God exists. The claim is born from 
humility on the part of the theologian, who cannot deny God's infinite importance, but is 
incapable of describing it at all.6 This humility is coherent with Hobbes' cosmological proofs for 
God; some entity beyond humans must have conditioned human existence, but that entity 
remains inaccessible. These are arguments that Hobbes inherits directly from his theological 
predecessors. It is just poor reasoning to conclude (as secularists are tempted to do) that Hobbes 
is an atheist in asserting 'we may have no knowledge of God's essence.' 
 The difference between Hobbes and medieval theologians is the first claim—that we can 
have no idea of God—which is consistent with his scientific materialism. Hobbes is an empiricist 
about human ideas. As Martinich explicates: “All human ideas are analyzable or reducible to 
sensations and God cannot be sensed” (186). Hobbes recognizes the problem of our finite 
phenomenology against an infinite God, but he also recognizes that people will question how an 
infinite thing affects us: “For Hobbes, the basis for believing in God is strictly analogous to the 
basis for believing in bodies” (192). That is, the existence of bodies is inferred rather than 
observed, but we would be unable to make sense of our existence without inferring such. 
 In other words, Hobbes devises a novel, scientific theory for a standard belief in God. 
Instances of this sort of theorizing (making a new theory for an old belief) permeate Leviathan.7 
Martinich puts it bluntly: “[Hobbes recognized] that certain propositions did not have the 
consequences traditionally attributed to them” (Martinich 39). Angels may exist, but exist 
materially; the Kingdom of God may exist, but may not exist yet, and so on. Hobbes consistently 
                                                          
6When asked the malevolent question of whether she knew she was in God's grace, the Maid of Orleans 
dumbfounded her persecutors when she answered: “If I am not, may God put me there; and if I am, may God so 
keep me. I should be the saddest creature in the world if I knew I were not in His grace.” 
7Instances of this sort of theorizing also permeate this very paper, maybe even more than I realize. See how many 
you can find! 
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brings the truths of religion into theoretical coherence with the method of science. 
 Furthermore, far from retreating into deism, Hobbes does this theoretical work about 
specifically Christian concepts. For example, he recognizes the difference between speculative 
and honorific talk about God. There may be no empirical idea of God's attributes, but we are 
fully within our rights to speak about God non-literally. For example, if we call God 'merciful' 
we might mean two things by it: speculatively, we might mean that God shows mercy out of 
remorse; honorifically, we might call God 'merciful' because “he does good things for humans” 
(Martinich 197). Hobbes is of the latter type of theology: “Worship which naturally men exhibite 
to Powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use 
towards me […] Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing” (Hobbes 1.12.9). Hobbes may attribute 
human virtues to God during his theology, but he does so because there are no other predicates 
available. 
 Much of Hobbes' skepticism about religious theory is ostensibly motivated by this sort of 
humility: “The Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; 
and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him” (Hobbes 
1.3.12). The same claim about God may be foolish or respectable depending on the intention of 
the speaker: “[Hobbes] devised various explanations that would justify preserving the ordinary 
talk without being mislead about its ultimate logical character” (Martinich, 202). If Hobbes were 
an atheist for this sort of theoretical talk, then so would be Aquinas, Anselm, and Grotius. 
 Martinich's explanation does, however, face a problem. If Hobbes were trying to 
reconcile the new science with religion, then he did not appear to succeed. The religionist must 
provide its own error theory; namely, if Hobbes were a Christian, then how could so many 
people err in their judgment of his Christianity? How could so many people conclude that he was 
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not a Christian? 
 I already explored the simple answer to this question: Christian religious differences were 
“more acrimonious in the seventeenth century” than they are now. People were unlikely to 
recognize Hobbes as part of a tradition that they thought he was attempting to ruin. There was no 
such thing as “bracketing” in the seventeenth century history of religion. Hobbes' critics would 
accuse him of atheism from their own theological perspective. This simple answer is too simple, 
however. Contemporary history of religion cares little about theological presuppositions but 
contemporary Hobbes scholars still fall prey to the illusion that Hobbes is obviously an atheist. 
 There is a more complex answer to the question that can explain more of the error. Both 
period and modern secularists accuse Hobbes of atheism because he represents a historical turn 
in the content of what religion was. Hobbes' theology exists during a very volatile time for 
religion. Hobbes is the heir of a theological tradition whose philosophical rigor contained the 
seeds of its own revolution. 
 Whatever his intention, Hobbes did not succeed in reconciling systematic theology and 
natural science. To conclude Martinich's biblical metaphor, “As it came to be worked out 
historically, the new skins turned the old wine into the vinegar of atheism. But I do not see that 
Hobbes should be faulted for his ingenious efforts” (7). I am not sure if the situation is so dire as 
the metaphor suggests, but the point is that there was a moment of self-negation contained in 
Hobbes' theology. Hobbes hastened the onset of religious uncertainty in spite of the confidence 
that he held in his theological work. 
 Thus, “his critics were [descriptively] correct, to a large extent, in sensing that his attempt 
to salvage religion would not work” (Martinich 80). Whatever sincerely clever arguments 
Hobbes has about God's scientific justification, the ideas are not obviously compatible: “The 
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challenges [of reconciling] was great – perhaps impossible to achieve – and there were no other 
models that Hobbes could draw on. If his theories are logically [contradictory], it is not because 
he wanted them to be but because he was struggling with an enormous problem” (28). 
 It is possible to misinterpret the complexity of Hobbes' religiosity, in part, because of this 
ambiguous historical position that he occupies, but that does not explain why Hobbes is, as a 
matter of fact, so often misinterpreted. Hobbes is not just ambiguous; he is dangerously 
ambiguous. He confounds the concepts of his period in a way we no longer do. Hobbes is the 
enemy of many people: he had the “misfortune to subscribe to a theology that was falling into 
disfavor.” He is the enemy of speculative theologians for his treatment of nature; and he is the 
enemy of Arminians who are anti-Calvinist (Martinich 334); he is the enemy of liberals for his 
absolutism; and he is the enemy of royalists for his support of any stable sovereign, including 
Cromwell; he is the enemy of the modern Christian for his union of church and state; and he is 
the enemy of the modern atheist for the same reason; he is the enemy of medieval statists for 
making religion a legal matter, and he is the enemy of the Westphalian statist for reminding us 
that the modern state is a recent invention. 
 Hobbes is not a simple failure to reconcile religion and natural science; he is a “glorious 
failure” (8) who is misinterpreted because of how many people he can threaten. The enemy of 
my enemy is a useful weapon, and Hobbes is tempting to misinterpret because his ambiguity 
makes him an extraordinarily adaptable weapon. 
Martinich demonstrates the plausibility that Hobbes was some sort of orthodox Christian. 
He has described Hobbes in a specific, detailed history, and he has argued that, absent some evi-
dence to the contrary, we ought to take Hobbes at his word regarding his religion; however, there 
is a case for Hobbes' atheism that accounts for the same historical data with a similar elegance. 
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Indeed, if my theory is correct, then Hobbes should be able to threaten even the best religionist 
case. I identified several conditions that such a threat must meet: the atheist case must show the 
plausibility of atheism and also explain why Hobbes would invent an entire theology to lie about 
his atheism. I will now proceed to examine the best way that the secularist may weaponize 
Hobbes' ambiguity.  
3. WEAPONS FOR THE NATURALIST 
Earlier, I distinguished between two concepts: the plausibility of an argument and the 
logical interest of an argument. These are not random attributes; they are two different virtues an 
argument can have. A plausible argument has good grounds for accepting it as true; but an 
argument is logically interesting when it elegantly explains all of the data of a question. In other 
words, there is a difference between the strength of an argument's truth and the importance of 
what the argument means.   
 There is no necessary connection between an argument's plausibility and an argument's 
interest.8 I have tried to strip away the uninteresting payoffs for Hobbes' atheism to determine 
what the most interesting case for his atheism would be. That secularist argument is that Hobbes, 
an atheist, manipulates Christian concepts, for his entire life, to support his political philosophy. 
This argument is eerily similar to the religionist argument, which is that Hobbes, a Christian, 
uses Christian concepts, for his entire life, for which his political philosophy provides an 
instance. In other words, the secularist and religionist arguments share most of their propositions 
                                                          
8For example, the link between Hume and Kant is fully appreciable only when comparing the payoffs of their 
philosophies. Hume famously argues that we have no ground to believe in the law of causality. Kant's Critique of 
Human Nature argues for why we can create a locally true law of causality. The payoff of Humeian skepticism is 
a paralysis of judgment, in spite of Hume's desires. The payoff of Kant's transcendental idealism is to hew a right 
of science from the mountain of Hume's skepticism. The point of the first Critique is not obvious without 
appreciating the target of its implications. 
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about Hobbes. The difference is in what those statements mean and what data those statements 
explain. 
 This particular version of the secularist argument is interesting because it signifies the 
persistence of the same sorts of conflicts that Hobbes himself was entering into. We saw before 
how Hobbes himself often disputed the theoretical explanations of traditional Christian concepts 
without debating the concepts themselves. Similarly, the best arguments for and against his 
atheism share their opinions on the facts of what Hobbes is doing. The arguments differ in terms 
of their theoretical explanations about what he is doing, and in doing so, these arguments 
reproduce a lot of what Hobbes was himself doing. What remains to be seen is whether there is a 
plausible case for this most logically interesting argument that considers Hobbes an atheist. 
 In Hobbes and Christianity, Paul Cooke makes this argument as plausible as I think has 
been made. Cooke's argument shares several elements of Martinich's. Martinich's argument has 
two basic parts: (1) Hobbes' project is to reconcile the truth of Christianity with the new methods 
of science; (2) Hobbes subordinates religious authority to the sovereign because only the 
sovereign has the authority to dictate those matters. Cooke addresses this explicitly: 
I agree with Martinich concerning this goal, for Hobbes does very much aim toward 
reconciling the Bible with the findings of unassisted human reason, with the findings, that 
is, of modern science. But I must  disagree with Martinich concerning what this 
reconciliation means for Christianity […] Martinich does not believe Christianity is done 
any harm, while I believe that Hobbes aims to place it in permanent eclipse. (Cooke 32) 
Cooke's point is that, yes, Hobbes synthesizes Christian theology with scientific theory, but the 
reason that Hobbes does so is more nefarious than Martinich realizes. Hobbes does theology not 
from apophatic humility, but because Hobbes needs to subordinate the political elements of 
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Christianity to his sovereign. 
 This theory answers the previous puzzle about why Hobbes, were he an atheist, would 
write theology so prolifically: “Hobbes was aware that his readers were persons with deep 
intellectual commitments to theology […] To persuade such readers, Hobbes had to be 
[religiously] persuasive, but Hobbes' capacity to be persuasive does not necessitate the 
genuineness of his commitment to those things he understood so well” (Cooke 34).  In other 
words, Hobbes needs theology to ensure people will accept the value of his version of the 
common good. 
 The common good of Hobbes' political theory is peace, because war is execrable. War is 
a state of being; it “consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during 
all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (Hobbes 1.13.8). War is the state of “every man 
against every man,” which obtains whenever we are “without a common power to keep [us] all 
in awe.” There is nothing sadder and more pointless to Hobbes than the life of people living in a 
state of war: 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: 
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by Sea; no commodious building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no 
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society: and which is worst of all, continuall 
feare, and danger of violent death. And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short. (Hobbes1.13.14) 
Any common power that can secure the peace must be preferable to the state of war. Therefore, 
religion must be either managed such that its power keeps people in peaceful awe, or not 
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admitted into the state at all. 
 Cooke argues that Hobbes chooses the former, and that the second half of Leviathan is 
the means to this end: Hobbes writes to persuade “educated readers for whom faith in God 
remains a real possibility and yet whose understanding of religion is susceptible to 
transformation” (Cooke 204). 
 This theory makes sense of an atheist Hobbes who also writes comprehensive theology. 
That is, given that peace is the highest good, a sovereign's command of religion is necessary to 
ensure that peace. Hobbes hid his atheism, not because he was afraid of being burned at the stake 
or some such nonsense, but because being a candid atheist would undermine his project to make 
religion “consistent with his teaching about the human situation [in] the state of nature” (Cooke 
14). 
 Such is the logically interesting value of Cooke's argument, but, as I have shown, that is a 
different matter from whether Cooke's argument is true. Before I analyze the implications of 
Cooke's argument, I should examine its brute plausibility. To understand Cooke's arguments, we 
must first say something about the role of Hobbes' so called “teaching about the human situation 
in the state of nature.” 
 Hobbes is one of the first of whom we call “state of nature theorists.” He is so called in 
that he deduces the matter of his philosophy by analyzing the “natural condition of mankind.” 
Hobbes admits only two kinds of knowledge: 
Whereof one is Knowledge of Fact; the other is Knowledge of the Consequence of one 
Affirmation to another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory […] The latter 
is called Science [and] this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of 
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him that pretends to Reasoning. (Hobbes 1.9.1)9 
For Hobbes, the only knowledge not deduced from consequences is history. All other knowledge 
is derived from analyzing consequences. Accordingly, Leviathan flows from general 
observations “Of Man” to the consequences “Of a Christian Commonwealth.” 
 Chapters 13 and 14 of Leviathan are Hobbes' account of the state of nature and the 
consequently derived natural laws. The state of nature is one of equality, liberty, and alienation. 
That is, people are equally fragile; each is at liberty to preserve themselves, and we have no 
natural connection to other people. It is not that people are inherently brutal and selfish, nor 
inherently compassionate and altruistic. People are naturally inclined to preserve themselves, and 
being brutal and selfish is the only logical way to preserve ourselves in the absence of social 
institutions. From the state of nature, Hobbes deduces two laws of nature: the first is to seek 
peace when possible and defend oneself otherwise; the second is to give up liberties in order to 
make peace possible, when others also will (1.14.4,5). To put the rest of the book into a single 
sentence: one should therefore cede authority to a sovereign who commands the religion of the 
state. 
 Systematic, deduced philosophies like this are no longer in vogue, but they were well 
established during Hobbes' time. One tempting way to read Christianity into Hobbes is to read 
him in light of the Christian scholastic tradition, from “Richard Hooker, and, most powerfully to 
Thomas Aquinas,” whose Summa Theologica is the example par excellence (Cooke 64). In other 
words, Hobbes' deduction of natural laws somehow obtain their lawful status from God. After 
deducing a list of natural laws beyond the two mentioned above, Hobbes says outright: 
These dictates of  Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they 
                                                          
9Chapter 9 of Leviathan consists of two pages. The first page is a longer version of what I quoted. The second page 
is a fascinating diagram of the taxonomy of sciences, and is an excellent illustration of how Hobbes conceives of 
deduction from one area of knowledge to another. 
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are but Conclusions [whereas] Law properly is the word of him that by right hath 
command over others. [The] same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by 
right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes. (1,15) 
Chapters 13-15 of Leviathan paint a compelling picture that God is the foundation of Hobbes' 
natural law, apparently linking Hobbes with the Christian natural law tradition. 
 Cooke's rebuttal is that this apparent equation is really an equivocation: “This equation is 
a tactic, a part of Hobbes' ambiguous style directed at disguising his fundamental departure from 
Christianity” (64). Cooke will argue that every time Hobbes appeals to God in this way, it is 
because Hobbes is craftily encouraging Christians to see their tradition in the state. 
 Cooke's argument has three general parts: (1) God is logically superfluous to Hobbes' 
political philosophy; (2) Hobbes departs significantly from scholastic theologians; (3) Hobbes 
departs from the orthodox Christianities of the period.10 Alone, none of these elements strictly 
bar Christianity from Hobbes, but the combination accounts for what Hobbes' “fundamental 
departure from Christianity” is. 
 Cooke's first task is to prove that God and the second half of Leviathan are superfluous to 
the theory of the contracted sovereign state. This part of Cooke's argument relies on the 
ambiguous senses of obligation in political philosophy, and it is the matter of the third chapter of 
Hobbes and Christianity. The law of nature obliges humans to form a commonwealth, but the 
question for us is whether that obligation requires God. 
 There are two points here. The first is that obligation is the alienation of a right: 
“Obligations only occur when [people] give up some liberty or right themselves. They are self-
assumed and not set over human beings by any other means” (Cooke 53). The second is that 
                                                          
10Each of these components contains extremely technical debates about things like obligation, freedom, reason, 
piety, and so on. I will not be entertaining them at that level of detail. I encourage interested readers to read 
Hobbes and Christianity for detailed accounts. 
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obligations arise from mutual fear: “The laws of nature oblige because human beings always 
seek their own good, the primary good being maintenance of life itself” (Cooke 56). This read is 
consonant with the chapters in which Hobbes speaks of natural obligation:“God is not necessary 
to establish a basis of obligation upon which Hobbes' political philosophy may operate” (Cooke 
60). 
 If Cooke's argument stopped there, it would be no argument at all; philosophers 
sometimes rely on superfluous premises; however, Hobbes' purportedly disguised atheism looks 
more apparent after considering what the natural law is for. The Christian scholastics deduced 
natural law not only from the “eternal law” of God, but for it: “Higher divine reason, the telos, 
which Aquinas' eternal law proclaims [is] neglected in Hobbes's natural law teaching where self-
preservation is the chief end” (Cooke 64). 
 Hobbes' sense of reason is not some divine spark through which we discern good and 
evil; it is the means through which we create the possibility of good or evil. Without establishing 
peace, “the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is 
no common Power there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice […] They are Qualities that 
relate to men in Society, not in Solitude” (Hobbes 1.13.13). In other words, our reason does not 
participate in the law; it creates it. This change in the source of the law is a notable departure 
from the natural law theology. 
 Cooke continues by comparing the different notions of self-preservation for both Hobbes 
and Richard Hooker: “Hooker writes that Christ has provided this natural law of loving one's life 
for the protection of the church [so that] they might live a long life and [be] persuaded of the 
verity of divine love” (Cooke 66). Cooke argues that there is no such telos for Hobbes above 
peace. I argued earlier that Hobbes' religious skepticism is born more from humility than 
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dismissal, and I reassert that here. Hobbes does embrace the virtue of this loving humility when 
thinking about God; his harshest criticisms of religious people are how they delude themselves 
through arrogance into thinking that their finite selves know something infinite.11 That said, the 
humility of Hobbes' theology does not seem needed for his deduction of a commonwealth from 
the natural law. 
 The fact that Hobbes is neither Aquinas nor Hooker is hardly proof that he is an atheist. 
The plurality of Christianities means that theologians often depart from their predecessors, and 
the cunning of history deems them heretics or saints. In other words, if we accepted the sectarian 
abuse among Christians as evidence for who is non-Christian, then we miss everyone from 
Pelagius to Jeanne d'Arc. If Cooke relied purely on such historical departures, then he would be 
making a poor argument, but he does not. 
 Cooke argues that “Hobbes's departure from the theological bearings held by his religious 
contemporaries actually represents a departure from Christian orthodoxy” (113). That is, Hobbes' 
departure is not a systematic natural-law theology, nor a reformation of Christianity, nor 
Martinich's “glorious failure” to provide scientific backing to theology. Rather, Hobbes' 
departure is a calculated effort to drain the marrow from religion, leaving the skeleton 
undisturbed. 
 “Before we can say Hobbes departs from orthodoxy, it must be established that there is 
such a thing” (113). Such begins Cooke's survey of the Protestant reformation. This is the most 
direct counter-argument to Martinich's case that Hobbes is an orthodox Calvinist. It is the most 
direct counter-argument to the case that I presented earlier, that Hobbes is a Protestant, who 
                                                          
11
“When men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall 
God […] it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour 
him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodie Visible” (Leviathan 
1,12). 
26 
encourages humble piety for matters of faith along the vested, sovereign authority who dictates 
formal religious doctrine. 
 Hobbes unequivocally states that God, who by right commandeth all things, elevates 
theorems into laws, and in doing so “Hobbes was endeavoring to elevate the status of natural 
reason, as many of his contemporaries wished to do” (Cooke 120). Cooke surveys many 
reformers, but the important ones here are Luther and Calvin: “The Reformers' approach to the 
authority of Scripture was conservative; that is, they wished above all to conserve the text as 
utterly authoritative […] They believed that through the Holy Spirit believers would understand 
the Bible in the only proper sense, its true, natural, 'literal' sense” (Cooke 121,2). Luther and 
Calvin are suspicious of reason; left to its own devices, reason will adulterate the Bible. Hobbes 
is also suspicious of adulteration, but he does not privilege the Bible as a surer path to knowledge 
than independent reason. Both are plausibly adulterations. The final word of religion for Hobbes 
is the sovereign, contra the text. 
 Cooke also dissociates Hobbes from the liberal Protestants of the time, notably the 
Arminians and the Oxford Rationalists (Cooke 125,6). These groups are closer to Hobbes' sense 
of independent reason: “Reason was the instrument to bring [people] to Scripture, to defend 
Scripture from the interpretations of extremists, particularly those of the Calvinist position with 
their stark predestinarian views, as well as those that give the authority of interpretation to the 
Roman Church” (Cooke 125). In other words, the purpose of human reason is to honor God. 
Cooke's primary example here is Chillingworth, who, like Hobbes, “believed that human beings 
could not finally know whether the tenets of Christianity were true or false.” Unlike Hobbes, 
however, Chillingworth's reason “always bows in genuine belief before the God of the Bible and 
it never serves a view of man independent of the claims of the Bible” (130). 
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 This idea that natural reason is the humble attempt to comprehend the incomprehensible 
is the nearest to Hobbes'. Reason forms a natural limit on the types of questions that humans may 
investigate. But where Chillingworth's reason “throws up its arms and falls on its knees, 
submitting to the words found in Scripture” Hobbes' sense of reason absolves us of the need to 
worry about scripture at all (Cooke 132). Hobbes is concerned with deducing the proper political 
life for humans within our limited abilities, rather than risking errors by pursuing knowledge of 
what cannot be known. Cooke isolates Hobbes outside of Christianity by divorcing him from 
each Christianity in turn. That argument substantially addresses the cases for isolating Hobbes 
within one of the many Christianities available. Cooke goes on to a detailed reading of several 
chapters in part three of Leviathan, but I believe that the case that Hobbes is an atheist is made 
quite plausible by now. 
 In any case, let us grant, for the moment, that Hobbes is an atheist. There is still 
something left to explain. If Hobbes were an atheist peace-lover, and religion destabilizes peace, 
then why appropriate theology? Why not eliminate it from politics entirely? These questions 
return us to the logically interesting aspect of Cooke's argument. Cooke must first argue that 
Hobbes sees religion as a threat to peace, and then Cooke must explain why Hobbes would opt to 
“tame” the threat rather than slay it. 
 The first argument (that religion is a threat to peace) is a familiar enough one: “England 
and the world of Christendom of the seventeenth century general offered sufficient example of 
this” (Cooke 88).12 My thesis is not a survey of religious violence, so I will grant this premise for 
the sake of argument. 
                                                          
12There are theories ad nauseum about violence and religion. Cooke argues that the Christianity of Hobbes' time is 
basically premelinneal, concerned with a future world, unconcerned with the present, and so on. In other words, 
a Christian would have no reason to swear allegiance to a mortal king; therefore, there is no reason to respect the 
mortal king; therefore, religious violence. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant to this paper. 
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 The second argument (tame, rather than slay, religion) can obtain for only prudential 
reasons, that is, religion is too powerful to destroy, so it must be “tamed” (Cooke 206). Cooke 
has to explore Hobbes' psychology of religion in order to argue that Hobbes thought something 
like this. 
 On the psychological level, I previously showed that Hobbes considered the attempt to 
speak knowingly about God to be arrogant. Hobbes argued that we should theologize out of piety 
rather than attempt to know something that is by definition unknowable. 
 These remain true statements; however, arrogance is the psychological result of dogmatic 
theology, not its psychological cause. The cause for such arrogant theology is the fear of things 
unknown: 
This perpetuall feare, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it 
were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore there is nothing to 
be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, 
or Agent Invisible. In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the 
Gods were first created by humane Feare. (Hobbes 1.12.6). 
Religion emerges psychologically in order to address the fear of death. Hobbes follows this 
invective with a non-fearful way to conceive of God: “from the desire men have to know the 
causes of natural bodies, and their several vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what 
was to befall them in the time to come.” Therefore, while there is theoretically a pious way to do 
theology in Hobbes' account, most theology is in fact born of fear. 
 Cooke argues that Leviathan's second half is written to suppress these fears: “Politics 
comes into being to secure human beings from fear of violent death at the hands of men, but 
religion comes into being because of fear of what lies beyond death” and without addressing that 
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second fear, a “remedy from the disorders of commonwealth cannot succeed” (Hobbes and 
Christianity 205). In other words, securing our mortal lives cannot sate our “yearning for a fuller 
understanding of the meaning of life.” Therefore! Hobbes appropriates the soothing powers of 
religion and strips away the rest. We have arrived at the most interesting and plausible 
explanation for how all of Hobbes' religious talk could be atheism. 
 There is still not exactly ground to call Hobbes an atheist, or even non-Christian. There 
are plenty of Christian philosophers who delve into even stranger, heterodox waters.13 I am 
content to take Hobbes at his word and analyze the virtues and detriments of whatever kind of 
Christianity that Hobbes says he belongs to. But I must also conclude that Hobbes is an historical 
anomaly: 
Anglican divines, the Oxford rationalists theologians, Puritan clergymen, and the 
Cambridge Platonists, among others, were each offended by Hobbes's application of 
reason to revelation. [Reason] was to operate within certain broad bounds beyond which 
Christian faith was violated; […] in this important sense Hobbes departed from 
orthodoxy (Cooke 132). 
Hobbes is again the enemy of many people. He is ambiguous, adaptable, transitory. Whatever 
Hobbes secretly, really believed is not as interesting as the importance of his ambiguous legacy 
to the history of philosophy. 
 Why could Hobbes, whose natural politics secure us from death, not provide a good 
reason to accept the politics without religion? What was lacking in his naturalistic explanation? 
Hobbes' use of non-natural motives for his natural politics illuminates something of the change 
he represents in the history of philosophy: 
Hobbes reveals the modern propensity to ask the 'how' of things to the exclusion of the 
                                                          
13In modern philosophy, Kant and Hegel would be the exemplars. 
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'why.' The overlooking of 'the problem of life'—the question of origins and of what 
[people] ultimately [are]—represents the [exclusion] of this realm of thought in the 
debates concerned with political and moral life […] But the 'problem of life' remains the 
real question behind a great part of moral discussion. (Cooke 235) 
Hobbes was a person who was confident and certain in his values during a historical period 
where confidence and moral certainty were starting to dissolve. Out of sincerity, cleverness, or 
both, Hobbes uses the Christian tradition to preserve a common moral criteria in a time of 
increasing moral uncertainty within the moral language: “Hobbes' argument shows the potential 
result of [religious] quarreling: it reduces the awe; it lowers the degree of authority the Bible will 
have over human beings” (Cooke 167). Hobbes' treatment of theology is simultaneously a mirror 
of the historical uncertainty infecting the Bible's moral authority and a challenge to the historical 
uncertainty infecting moral authority in general. 
To ask whether Hobbes is secretly a Christian or secretly an atheist is to miss the signifi-
cance of this ambiguous, historical challenge. In broader terms, to demand clarity about whether 
a historical figure is part of one subjective identity or another is to miss the significance of the 
fact that it is not clear in the first place. The lack of clarity is itself data to be explained. To de-
mand clarity in Hobbes' case is to miss the significance of the lessening certainty about what the 
good, political, moral life is for the human. Furthermore, the demand for such clarity in a climate 
of moral uncertainty betrays a host of moral problems operating in the background of our alleg-
edly historical investigation. Our moral failure is to read Hobbes without this historical transition 
in mind, which has led to a Hobbes that can mean anything, about any topic.  
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4. WEAPONS OF THE STATE 
So far I have spoken only about the religious heritage that informs the confused history of 
Hobbes' philosophy, but Hobbes is not merely an adaptable weapon in the history of religion. 
Hobbes is an adaptable weapon in the history of modern politics. He is interesting not just to 
people like Cooke and Martinich, but also to anyone interested in the history of the liberal, 
Westphalian state. I shall now begin to explore how the disputes in the history of Hobbes' 
politics, ethics—his values in general as they relate to history—expose the same interpretive and 
moral problems that they expose in the history of religion. 
 Our investigation of Hobbes' religion has reached a state of aporia. I have shown how, 
despite this aporia, that is, despite the question being descriptively unanswerable and 
normatively suspicious, the question of whether Hobbes was a Christian or atheist remains 
valuable ammunition for historians of Hobbes. He is easily transformed into ordinance for the 
cannons of the history of religion. The question is a non-starter, yet it is started quite often. What 
exactly is going on here?  How can we best explain the problems we encounter during our 
interpretations of his religion? 
 Martinich advances one theory: “[Secularists] do so out of a strange kind of respect for 
[Hobbes]. Since they […] read Hobbes because they think that he can help them attain their 
aspiration, they are happy to abandon his own argument when they think he fails them” (Two 
Gods 11). In other words, people are not faithful enough to what Hobbes actually says and 
means. 
 Infidelity to Hobbes' writing, however, is only one of the more obvious and cruder ways 
of stating the problem. Hobbes' adaptability is not just a problem of interpretive charity; in fact, 
it is because contemporary, secular liberals want to be charitable to Hobbes that they ignore his 
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arguments that are less-than-brilliant. The principle of charity has an ulterior motive, granted, but 
that does not explain the subtler utility of Hobbes.14 Cooke and Martinich are generally faithful 
historians, and both of them use Hobbes as a weapon. 
 Martinich claims that his argument is “truer to what Hobbes said and meant,” (45) but so 
what? Getting the true meaning of an argument is one of many virtues when interpreting 
someone's work. We often talk about the influences of someone's work, their ethical applications, 
their psychological stories, whether they are hypocrites or not, and so on.15 There is what Hobbes 
said and meant, and there is also the legacy of Hobbism. Getting the true meaning of an 
argument is a good, but it is not a good in a vacuum; it is a good for a particular hermeneutic. 
 The hermeneutic issue here resonates with our earlier point about the difference in 
theoretical and propositional disagreement. Investigating what Hobbes' said and meant is an 
issue about his propositional belief, but the problem that we are currently investigating concerns 
the theoretical explanation for why Hobbes is easy to misinterpret. In other words, the said and 
meant criterion is the wrong too for the job. To put it counter-factually, even if every reader of 
Hobbes were charitable to him and tried to get at what he said and meant, that would not 
eliminate the problem of figuring out what Hobbes signifies, or why he should signify. Martinich 
and Cooke weaponize Hobbes to make their particular hermeneutic the valuable one. An 
alternate motivating value for the interpretation of Hobbes is a threat to Martinich and Cooke 
alike. 
 The reverse of this hermeneutical medal is not a tidy solution either. Hobbes is not 
                                                          
14The principle of charity: when arguing against someone, assume that they make the best argument possible and 
interpret their arguments as valid when the arguments are ambiguous. 
15Augustine's psychological history in the Confessions is informative to his theories of grace and free will. Lenin's 
philosophical critique of opportunism did not prevent him from creating totalitarian security measures after 
seizing power. Cartoonish misinterpretations of Darwin led to forced sterilizations and the most evil, 
governmental eugenics programs. What these thinkers truly “said and meant” is the tip of the iceberg of their 
historical importance. 
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necessarily identical to the legacy of Hobbism, but the legacy of Hobbism—its influence, its 
ethical application, its psychological story, its hypocrisy, and so on—is also not a good in a 
vacuum. Even if every reader of Hobbes were attentive to his historical legacy, that would not 
eliminate the problem of figuring out what he said and meant. The point is not that there is no 
value in investigating each of these values of Hobbes; the point is, contrarily, that there is too 
much value to be extracted from Hobbes for any of our candidates to deal with! 
 Hobbes is so threatening because he is ambiguous. Do not misunderstand; I do not mean 
that he is linguistically ambiguous, but that he participates in a historically ambiguous time in 
philosophy. This does not just mean that he is the enemy of many enemies; he is the heir to 
several traditions but is servant to none. His style and concepts are informed by systematic, 
deductive theology, but his methods and values are the embryo of something new. It is our 
contemporary moral imposition that says he is valuable for what he “said and meant” and it is the 
same moral imposition that fails to provide us with any way to agree on what he “said and 
meant.” Therefore, absent a theoretical explanation of the his commitments, Hobbes can mean 
anything.  
 When I say that Hobbes can mean anything, I mean that he can mean things that he 
explicitly opposed. So far, I have shown the process of his weaponization only in a controversial 
area of his philosophy, namely, whether he upholds Christianity or destroys it; however, the same 
process occurs in even questions which are more-or-less solved. That is, I can (and if I am right I 
should be able to) demonstrate Hobbes' historical ambiguity in areas where he is not 
linguistically ambiguous at all. Hobbes is unambiguously against the practice of rebellion against 
an absolute, sovereign power, but just as he participates in the simultaneous destruction and 
preservation of Christianity, his philosophy can legitimately imply not only rebellion against the 
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state but anarchism as a preferable choice to his own sovereign. 
 The point is that even though Hobbes' perspective on rebellion is linguistically clear, the 
question of Hobbes' philosophy of rebellion will be just as unanswerable as the question of his 
religion. My goal is to expose the historical ethics that envelop Hobbes' political philosophy. It is 
true that Hobbes opposes rebellion, but there is also some truth to the implausible thesis that he 
provides a right to rebel against the sovereign, even when he obviously did not (and could not) 
say or mean that. Even in this settled issue, his adaptable, historical ambiguity will isolate the 
embryo of Hobbes' transitory values. 
 The argument that Hobbes prohibits rebellion is extremely easy to make. I have 
established that the highest good for Hobbes is peace. Because Hobbes is a good, deductive 
philosopher, the arguments that the sovereign is absolute and rebellion is prohibited are 
deductions from the argument for peace. I will go through each of these deductions in turn. 
 Peace is the state where our lives need not be solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 
Hobbes accepts this axiomatically and holds this position consistently. The commonwealth is the 
means to peace: “The finall Cause [of] men, (who naturally love Liberty and Dominion over 
others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves [a commonwealth] is the foresight 
of their own preservation […] that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable 
condition of Warre” (Hobbes 2.17.1). In other words, the whole point of a commonwealth is to 
secure peace when we are naturally induced to make each other insecure. 
 The only way that Hobbes can see to secure such peace is by a near-absolute transfer of 
power to some sovereign power: 
The only way to erect such a common power […] is to conferre all their power and 
strength upon one Man, or Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, in plurality 
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of voices, unto one Will […] This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of 
them all, in one and the same Person […] as if every man should say to every man, I 
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man. (Hobbes, 2.17.13) 
And there we are. There are details for Hobbes to work out, such as what kind of sovereign 
should be used, and under what conditions a sovereign is meaningfully a sovereign, but the 
general point is clear. Subjects transfer almost all of their natural liberties for civil peace, and 
they definitely transfer the right to rebel. 
 The value that Hobbes places on peace does not mean that he is a pacifist. The office of 
the sovereign may and should make war when an external force threatens the civil peace 
(Hobbes 2.18.12). There is a difference, however, between the justice of a war waged by the 
sovereign against external power and the subversive war waged by subjects against the 
sovereign; subjects have no right at all to punish the sovereign: “No man that hath Soveraigne 
power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished” (Hobbes 
2.18.7). 
 Just as the sovereign may use any means necessary to protect the peace from enemies of 
the state, so may the sovereign avenge itself on rebels. Because rebellion threatens the civil 
peace in the commonwealth itself, Hobbes is extremely harsh on rebels: 
Upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberately deny the Authority of the 
Commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, 
but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of 
the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the 
renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called 
Rebellion, and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjets, but as Enemies. For Rebellion is 
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but warre renewed. (2.28.23) 
A rebellion is nothing but the willful reversion to a state of nature that, apart from being unjust, is 
offensive to Hobbes: “If the essential Rights of Soveraignty be taken away, the Common-wealth 
is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition [of] warre with every other man, 
which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life” (2.30.3). 
 However, there is more to Hobbes' absolutism; the sovereign does not have a blank check 
to do anything it pleases. The sovereign has all civil authority and has no civil obligations; 
however, the sovereign is obliged by nature to ensure peace in civil society: “The office of the 
Soveraign [whatever its form] consisteth in the end [of[ the procuration of the safety of the 
people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God” 
(2.30.1). A sovereign is obliged to meaningfully be a sovereign. 
 While the lack of a legal rebellion may not satisfy later liberal sensibilities, Hobbes' ideal 
sovereign is not a fat, selfish despot. A sovereign who is tyrannical and cruel may find their 
peaceful society crumbling around them, with no one to blame but themselves. In other words, 
while a sovereign cannot act unjustly (because the sovereign is the possibility of justice) a 
sovereign can unwisely be in contradiction with the faithful purpose of the sovereign. This point 
is a far cry from justifying rebellion, but it is important to distinguish between the civil authority 
created in a contract and the natural liberties that people cannot alienate.16 To put it another way, 
one of the sovereign's duties is to prevent rebellion; if the sovereign fails to prevent rebellion, 
then something has gone wrong on the natural level, rather than the civil. 
 I have asserted that Hobbes represents a moment where history turns, where he bears the 
                                                          
16Hobbes distinguishes true and false liberties. False liberty is liberty from the law, which, because the law ensures 
liberty of bodily saftey, such liberty is a contradiction in terms. True liberties are civilly inalienable, and 
seemingly odd for Hobbes to admit. They will be important later, when considering whether there is ever a right 
to rebel. 
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embryo of some sort of change in values. Therefore Hobbes should not be the only one to betray 
these ideas about the sovereign, and he is not the only one. His position on rebellion is a mirror 
of his historical moral, which inheres in period philosophers who do not accept most of Hobbes' 
arguments about the natural state of humanity. The distinction between the natural and civil 
realms is one part of Hobbes' ambiguous heritage. 
 In keeping with the distinction between theoretical and propositional disagreement, the 
systematic theologians before Hobbes will share some of his propositions and some of this 
theories. Thinkers whose theories are much kinder to our human nature than Hobbes' will share 
Hobbes' premises on certain matters. I demonstrated already how Hobbes' theories about 
theological concepts often do not question the concept itself. To make this point in the realm of 
politics and natural law, I shall consider how the political theories of Hugo Grotius bear on the 
justice of rebellion. By examining Grotius and Hobbes in parity, I shall expose some of the 
elements of Hobbes' moral inheritance. 
 Grotius is an interesting foil for Hobbes because Grotius is considered a supporter of law 
through cooperation, whereas Hobbes thinks we can cooperate only when coerced. My task is to 
show that Hobbes and Grotius share and rely on a common moral heritage in spite of their 
conceptual differences. Hobbes values peace because it is not war; Grotius values peace for 
itself. Both Hobbes and Grotius, however, argue for the right of war in eerily similar ways. 
Because foreign invasion destroys the commonwealth, Hobbes allows the sovereign the ability to 
wage war (2.18.12). Grotius likewise argues: 
In the first principles of nature there is nothing which is opposed to war; rather, all points 
are in its favor. The end and aim of war being the preservation of life and limb […] war is 
in perfect accord with those first principles of nature. If [for that purpose] it is necessary 
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to use force, no inconsistency with the first principles of nature are involved. (Grotius 
1.2.I.4) 
Though their motives are different about the right of war in general, both Hobbes and Grotius 
admit the ability for states to make just war. They do not admit that all wars by the state are just, 
but that they are at least sometimes permitted. 
 Wars of rebellion are not so clearly permissible to Grotius. Considering rebellion, Grotius 
asks: “The question to be considered is simply this, whether it is permissible for either private or 
official persons to wage war against those under whose authority they are, whether this authority 
be sovereign or subordinate” (1.4.I.2). Grotius helpfully starts with his conclusion to this 
question: while there is a provision to passively disobey sovereign commands that are against 
“the law of nature or commandments of God,” there is no provision to resist: “If from any such 
cause […] on the part of him who holds the sovereign power, unjust treatment be inflicted on us, 
we ought to endure it rather than resist by force” (1.4.I.3). Rebellion is not just on Grotius' 
account. 
 Grotius' argument is the same as Hobbes': 
By nature all men have the right of [self-defense.] But as civil society was instituted in 
order to maintain public tranquility, the state forthwith acquires over us and our 
possessions a greater right, to the extent necessary to accomplish this end. The state, 
therefore, in the interest of public peace and order, can limit the common right of 
resistance. (1.4.II.1) 
Because the very purpose of the state is tranquility, the state can and should ensure that 
tranquility by restricting the right of resistance. Without securing itself, “there will no longer be a 
state, but only a non-social horde” (Grotius 1.4.II.1). 
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 Grotius considers types of war along two categories: wars are waged by either private or 
sovereign powers and in an either domestic or foreign theater. Therefore there are eight (basic) 
logical permutations for war.  Wars are either foreign or domestic, and waged by any permutation 
of private individuals and sovereigns. Rebellion is war waged domestically, by private 
individuals, against a sovereign power. Each of the other warfare relationships is potentially just, 
but rebellion has some peculiar quality that is against the law of nature. 
 What, then, is the peculiar quality? It cannot be the destruction of a state, because 
sovereigns justly destroy other states, “as by David against the King of the Ammonites.” It 
cannot be that people must obey all sovereign power, for non-subjects may war against kings, “as 
by Abraham against the King of Babylon” (Grotius 1.4.I.1). The unique quality of rebellion is 
that it destroys one's own state. Rebellion is self-contradictory, destroying the security of the 
subject as well as the sovereign. Rebellion therefore destroys itself. 
 Hobbes is certainly in agreement on this point. The whole point of a society is to trade 
“my Right of Governing my selfe” so that I can be safe. To rebel against the sovereign power 
does not merely damage the people quantitatively; rebellion undermines the quality of life: 
“Lawes are of no power to protect [people], without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to 
cause those laws to be put in execution” (Hobbes 2.21.6). The law of nature is to self-preserve, 
and if the sovereign is required for self preservation, then rebelling is to reject the law of nature. 
 The logical interest of this argument is hard to understate. If rebellion is “but warre 
renewed,” then rebellion does not simply destroy a state; it destroys the conditions of possibility 
for a state. Rebellion is not unjust on this account as it is absurd: “This warre of every man 
against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and 
Wring, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no 
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Law, no Injustice” (Hobbes 1.13.13). Rebellion is therefore not so much detrimental to society as 
logically incompatible with it. 
 Grotius would agree on this point: “Maintenance of the social order, [which] is consonant 
with human intelligence, is the source of the law properly so called” (Prolegomena” 8). Rules 
against theft, the obligation of promises, and the right of retribution, are made possible by the 
social order. Rebellion cannot be just because it is logically prior to the concept of justice in the 
first place! This is why Hobbes considers it absurd how people “clamor” on about the right to 
govern themselves. The concept is nonsense to him. 
 There are, however, exceptions to the prohibition against rebellion. Grotius conceives of 
these exceptions as justified by necessity: “Even some laws of God carry a tacit exception in 
cases of extreme necessity […] hence the well-known saying: 'Danger to life breaks the Sabbath.' 
[…] The same principle holds even more manifestly in the case of human laws” (1.4.VII.1). He 
concludes by way of example that, “The Maccabees, therefore, had no justification except 
extreme and unavoidable danger. This justification held, at any rate, so long as they kept within 
the limits of self-defense” (1.4.VII.5). 
 Hobbes admits of exceptions for similar reasons but through another argument. While 
there are no civil justifications for rebellion, there are “true” liberties that subjects retain from 
nature, “that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, [the 
subject] may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do” (Hobbes 2.21.10). 
 I am foreshadowing a bit here, but far from being contradictory with absolute 
sovereignty, Hobbes' argument for absolute sovereignty entails the conditional ability to resist 
the sovereign. People give up their right to self-government for the purpose of securing their 
lives. We are not obliged to do anything contrary to that purpose: “If the Soveraign command a 
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man (though justly condemned) to wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault 
him [yet] hath that man the Liberty to disobey (Hobbes 2.21.12). It is the right of nature to 
preserve one's life; therefore, you are never obliged to roll over and die. 
 This does not mean that the sovereign has civil limits. The sovereign can do anything, but 
the sovereign's civil authority cannot nullify my natural right to self-preservation: “'Tis one thing 
to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. 
It followeth therefore, that No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or 
any other man” (Hobbes 2.21.14,15). You are not obliged to roll over and die, but you should not 
expect leniency either. It may be within your rights to commit regicide, but it is certainly within 
the rights of the next regent to torture you to death in public view. 
 Hobbes derives a host of “true liberties” on these grounds, including, for example, 
resisting arrest and deserting an army, so long as the goal is to preserve one's life. Hobbes 
qualifies these liberties in virtue of their purposes: “When therefore our refusall to obey, 
frustrates the End for which the Soveraign was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: 
otherwise there is” (2.21.15). Both I and the sovereign are obliged to be faithful to the purpose of 
the contract in the first place, but where I can be civilly punished, the sovereign's only judge is 
nature. 
 The important qualification here, however, is that self-preservation alone does not entail 
a right to rebel. The ostensible purpose of a rebellion is not just to self-preserve, but to dismantle 
the sovereign power. Neither Hobbes nor Grotius is willing to justify some opportunistic 
ideologue's attempt to seize power, not ever. They are willing to permit only the defense of one's 
life in conjunction with the authority of the sovereign. I will later explore whether there are more 
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transcendental Hobbesian arguments for rebellion, but Cromwell's sort of rebellion is right out.17 
So is, for that matter, the American Revolution. 
 I have shown that Hobbes and Grotius share an argument about the justice of rebellion, 
but I have not compared Hobbes and Grotius just to make this pedantic point. By now, the 
similarity in their prohibitions against rebellion should be apparent, but the point is to isolate the 
historical elements of these arguments that betray their mutually inherited moral framework.18 In 
isolating these common elements, I am not simply arguing that Hobbes and Grotius share several 
moral sentiments and behaviors that we no longer do, although I am arguing that. I am also 
arguing that the common value-elements in Hobbes' and Grotius' philosophy dialectically 
engender moral disagreement born from moral agreement. 
 This datum requires a theoretical explanation. Despite the propositional agreement that 
Hobbes and Grotius share on the nature of rebellion, their theories about why rebellion is 
unjustified begin to show the transformation of how philosophers conceive of value. Hobbes' and 
Grotius' theories are quite similar, with the only major change being that Hobbes requires a 
vicious state of nature to get to the same place that Grotius starts from. To state it from another 
perspective, there are still plenty of liberal statists around today who do not admit the possible 
justice of rebellion, but such statists rarely recourse to Hobbes' dismal picture of human nature. I 
am arguing about the ambiguous (really, irreducibly, ambiguous) changes in the theoretical 
explanations for historical values that persist and transform to varying degrees. 
 I am now prepared to consider how these ambiguous theoretical issues speak to the 
                                                          
17A transcendental argument is of the form: In order for x to be possible, y must be a condition for x. x is actual. 
Since everything actual is possible, therefore y. To foreshadow a bit, we can question whether Hobbes' state can 
possibly secure its ostensible purpose of security, and whether it is meaningfully a state at all. 
18For some context, Hobbes and Grotius lived at the same time, and were born in 1588 and 1583, respectively. On 
the Law of War and Peace and Leviathan are published in 1625 and 1651. Both books are composed during 
wars, namely, the Thirty Years War and the English Civil War. These factual circumstances are not the heritage I 
am considering, but these historical data indicate the extent to which the questions of lawful warfare and 
sovereignty are pertinent to the time. 
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character of Hobbes' and Grotius' common heritage. 
 The first elements I will consider are the concepts of the philosophy. These writings of 
these authors are about extremely broad topics, the elements of which cohere into some rigorous, 
systematic account of humanity. This sort of philosophy takes concepts like human nature and 
natural law as axiomatic. Hobbes' book does not begin with political critique, but rather a section 
“Of Man.” His first chapter is an argument for empiricist epistemology, and he spends a great 
deal of time contemplating how humans are in their natural condition. He considers the 
difference between the types of knowledge, how science should operate, and so on. Grotius also 
considers such broad concepts. He devotes his first chapter (one chapter!) to the questions “What 
is War? What is Law?” 
 No philosopher today could get away with this sort of inquiry. Grotius and Hobbes are 
able to do so because they share some common moral presuppositions. For examples: peace is 
the highest good; the end of war is peace; people are naturally disposed to seek their own 
interests; there are divine laws, natural laws, and civil laws. These thinkers share some common, 
minimal understanding of people's nature. We do not have this common understanding today. 
Not only do these suppositions crumble under anti-essentialism, but the importance of 
autonomous thought in liberalism makes such dogmatic suppositions untenable prima facie. 
Hobbes and Grotius are capable of having more confidence in the conceptual baggage they bring 
to their work. 
 This sort of conceptual assurance speaks to the style of the philosophy. Grotius and 
Hobbes share the element of being stylistically systematic. That is, they do not just consider a 
broad range of concepts, but they organize those concepts into some coherent whole. Science, for 
Hobbes, means the unity of the flow of concepts that contain one another. The idea that we may 
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figure out truth from what consequences are contained in concepts would come to be called 
“analytic” reasoning (contra “synthetic” reasoning.) Recall that, for Hobbes, every branch of 
philosophy operates by considering the consequences of things. The character of this kind of 
philosophy is that all of the parts hang together. All of the arguments in Leviathan seem to 
depend on one another. 
 For example, the compatibility of absolute sovereignty and the right to resist arrest cohere 
with the mood of how Hobbes conceives natural and civil rights. Each realm provides unique 
elements that paint the picture of the commonwealth: you can resist death, but the sovereign can 
punish you; this is not a problem because everyone likes to live, and the sovereign will wisely 
respect the lives of its subjects. If the sovereign is unwise, then it will be deposed, and we will 
claw our way out of nature again. 
 Hobbes crafts his philosophy seductively and elegantly, in a manner that could come only 
from this confidence in his state of nature. Grotius treats his subject similarly. He proceeds from 
general observations about war, and considers in turn every aspect of war as was known to him. 
This systematic style persists for quite a while in the history of philosophy, ending sometime 
around Hegel and Marx. This style required a confidence in the importance of the work that is 
not so obvious in contemporary philosophy. Contemporary academics are humbler in their goals, 
happy to contribute to a conversation and illuminate new problems in theories. Hobbes wanted to 
secure peace for the whole of humanity, and he devised a complete theology towards that end; 
Grotius wanted to explain justice in war so that people would know how to avoid flagrant abuses 
of power and punish the abuses that remained. 
 The character of Hobbes' heritage is therefore a different kind of confidence in doing 
philosophy. Even where he departs from this heritage, the character persists. His methodology is 
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a good example of his historical ambiguity. For example, Hobbes and Grotius, though writing in 
similar styles, did not reason in the same manner. Grotius is much more in line with Aquinas' 
type of reasoning, where he introduces a question, provides a preliminary answer, considers 
arguments for and against, then repeats his answer. Hobbes deduces all of his arguments from his 
premises, in a method more similar to contemporary, sentential logic. 
 This method is a good example of his ambiguity, because it contains the seeds of 
empirical science; however, deductive logic is not equivalent to contemporary empirical science. 
Logic relies on hypothetical inferences to preserve hypothetical truth; contemporary, post-
positivist, science has very little use for propositions that are not observed. Few people think that 
ethics and poetry are consequences of physics, as Hobbes did. But the embryo of contemporary 
science began in this more deductive manner. When Kant famously praised Galileo for setting 
physics on the “royal road” to science, he is praising the way Galileo made empirical 
observations after deducing the consequences of physical motion according to laws that he had 
previously known. 
 Hobbes made use of his deductive method to conclude the truths of things like 
materialism as well as human nature. It is not until much later on that the contemporary, more 
post hoc empirical science comes to fruition.19 For that matter, Hobbes would likely have had 
scathing criticisms of our contemporary model of science. Science does not require either 
Hobbes' “trayne of consequences” nor Kant's categories of understanding to make sense of the 
manifold of experience. We have a different set of moral baggage in our contemporary science 
than both Hobbes' philosophy and the immediate negation of Hobbes' philosophy. 
 My only point in this survey is this: Hobbes inherits a philosophical confidence that 
                                                          
19Hypothesize, test, refine, but say nothing about the way that the inter-subjective, transcendental unity of 
apperception enables this process. 
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begins to degrade soon after his time; and the inherited confidence degraded in spite of the 
sincere attempts to salvage it. So far, in terms of Hobbes' political philosophy, I have provided 
evidence only for the first half of this claim. I examined the links between Hobbes' and Grotius' 
moral heritage and examined the similarities in their political arguments. I will shortly examine 
the process of degradation in this arena of political sovereignty, but we saw both halves of this 
process at work already. Both elements—confidence and the degradation of confidence—
appeared in my analysis of Hobbes' treatment of religion. 
  On my account, Hobbes attempted to provide a new theoretical analysis of standard 
truths. Hobbes provided a theory to explain how, for examples, God and angels are material, that 
prophets are true but should not be recognized politically, that the kingdom of God was eternal 
but not yet arrived, and so on. Similarly, Martinich and Cooke devise different theories to 
analyze the truth of Hobbes' philosophy, but they agree on the proposition that Hobbes is, in fact, 
providing new theories about old propositions. Hobbes provides these theories in a confident and 
systematic way. 
 The fact remains that, whether by accident or subtle intention, Hobbes' new theories for 
religious propositions end up sacrificing the religious propositions. Why? God, materialism and 
sovereignty are not logically incompatible; however, they might be morally incompatible in a 
new, less confident milieu that cannot cope with nor comprehend the association of God with 
political science. Empirical science transformed from deductive inference to random 
experimentation to hypothesized experimentation to radical subjectivism to positivism to 
formalized, technical methods. So too did moral confidence change from axiomatic certainty to a 
natural deduction to utilitarianism to toleration. 
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What remains to be seen is how the political, scientific, ethical, and religious seeds that 
Hobbes plants bear fruit that Hobbes would not and could not have recognized as his own. 
Hobbes' historical ambiguity means that he can be weaponized even against Hobbes himself. I 
will demonstrate this potential by examining whether, despite all of the above, there is yet a 
Hobbesian right of collective rebellion to be cultivated from his absolutist seeds. Even when he 
is clear on a point, such that rebellion is not justified, that point obtains only given Hobbes' moral 
suppositions. For our degraded moral confidence, Hobbes will legitimately and consistently im-
ply anarchism. In this way, I can provide a theoretical explanation to the propositions of moral 
transformation, that is, that moral confidence degraded even when every historical transfor-
mation of it is born from an attempt to salvage that confidence. 
5. WEAPONS OF LIBERATION 
The argument about Hobbes and rebellion parallels the argument about Hobbes and 
religion. Previously, when we asked whether Hobbes is a Christian or an atheist, we arrived at a 
state of aporia. Even after granting the metric of getting at what he “said and meant,” there is not 
an obvious answer to the question. There is a similar aporia in the question of rebellion, but it 
extends beyond the limits of the “said and meant” metric. Hobbes clearly says that there is not 
ground for rebellion, and he means it. Nonetheless, I argue that his historical ambiguity persists. 
I will now argue the presence of Hobbes’ ambiguity in spite of his clear condemnation of 
rebellion. The ‘in spite of’ here is the most important element of the entire argument because it 
exposes additional elements in the process of weapononization. The weaponization of Hobbes’ 
religious ambiguity is easy to explain; it results from Hobbes not being totally clear and scholars 
reading him selectively. The weaponization of Hobbes’ statist ambiguity is harder to explain; it 
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results from his arguments up against a 400-year-old patina of confusion that has occluded the 
purpose of the social contract. 
To demonstrate this ambiguity ‘in spite of,’ I am going to argue something seemingly 
absurd. Not only am I going to argue that there is a Hobbesian right to rebel against the state, but 
that Hobbes' philosophy contingently asserts a political anarchism.20 This may be the least 
plausible thing that anyone could argue about Hobbes. He is not an anarchist himself. The 
question is so settled that Martinich even presupposes Hobbes' non-anarchism: “If Hobbes was 
an atheist, then he was also an anarchist” (Two Gods 26).21 Therefore, Hobbes' anarchism is the 
perfect thing to illustrate Hobbes' potential as a weapon. If Hobbes can be sincerely and 
charitably weaponized for anarchism, then my argument about his ambiguity is proven. 
 The general argument for these claims (rebellion and anarchism) relies on Hobbes' 
contractual nature of the state and the purpose of that contract. If the contract's purpose is 
frustrated, then it is not in force and there is no obligation to the state. This argument is not even 
so much an argument for Hobbes as it is a tautology: if there is no contract in force, then there is 
no contract in force. The purpose of Hobbes' contract is to secure, not just peace, but the ability 
to expect peace. If the purpose of the state either does not or cannot ensure peace, then the 
contract is frustrated and there can be no obligation to the state. 
 Susanne Sreedhar has detailed this argument—that rebellion is permissible in a frustrated 
state—in Hobbes on Resistance. The salience of her argument rests on Hobbes' set of cases 
where subjects may rightfully disobey the sovereign. Hobbes explicates the occasions of justified 
                                                          
20A political anarchist is one who advocates for positive resistance to the state. This is one step beyond the 
philosophical anarchist who argues that we simply have no obligation to obey the state. 
21Bishop Bramhall did famously accuse Hobbes of anarchism in his “The Catching of Leviathan.” However, this 
accusation was in the same mood as he accused Hobbes of atheism and fails for the same reasons we previously 
discussed. I do not think that it is controversial to say that almost no one today would call Hobbes himself an 
anarchist. Not even I am doing that. 
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disobedience: “If a man by the terror of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the 
Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation” 
(Hobbes 2.27.25). I mentioned several cases earlier, such as the right to resist arrest or flee the 
gallows. The general form of these rights is the right to self-preserve. 
 Sreedhar explores this right in her first chapter: “The right of self-defense can be best 
characterized as the right to take whatever actions one judges necessary to avoid an immediate 
threat of death” (8). This right is not just present against direct attack, but also includes things 
like stealing bread when starving. The right is properly the right to “save one's own life” when 
the power of the sovereign is either unavailable or unwilling (9). Self-defense is contained in 
self-preservation, but Sreedhar points out that self-preservation is a much “broader right of 
nature” (11). 
 Hobbes' support for the right to self-preserve is not controversial. The controversial part 
is whether rebellion can result from self-preservation. Sreedhar faces two obstacles in deriving 
rebellion from self-defense. The first obstacle is hermeneutic: Hobbes might just imply 
inconsistent things. The second obstacle is philosophical: the right to rebel appears to be 
collective while the right to self-preserve appears to be individual. Sreedhar must show that the 
right to rebel derives from the right of self-defense. The rest of Sreedhar's book is for making 
rebellion consistent with Hobbes' philosophy. I have little stake in the consistency issue. I will be 
focusing on whether rebellion is really contained in Hobbes' philosophy, inconsistently or 
otherwise. 
 One crucial point is that Hobbes' concept of rights is not identical to the modern concept 
of rights. In order to figure out the place of rebellion rights, I must first talk about what a 
Hobbesian right is. Sreedhar identifies three elements to the right of self-defense: “self-defense 
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[is] a subjective, permission, right retained by subjects in a commonwealth” (8). The right is 
subjective in that the individual must judge whether their own life is in peril. The only 
qualification Hobbes states is “that of sincerity” (Sreedhar 12). The person must sincerely feel 
themselves at risk, but no one can make that judgment but the person. 
 The ideas of permission and retention are more complex. The right is retained because it 
is a holdover from the state of nature, rather than created at the genesis of social contract.22 It is a 
“vestige” of the right of nature, but not identical to the right of nature (Sreedhar 15). For 
example, the right to legal representation is not a retained right because there are no courts and 
laws in which to retain representation. Self-preservation, on the contrary, finds a new theatre of 
relevance inside society. We retain rights either when the help of the law is unavailable (when 
you are waylaid by vagabonds) or when the law is not helpful (when the state tortures and 
executes you.) 
 The idea of permission is the most peculiar of these three elements. A Hobbesian right 
gives “freedom from blame; it bestows a kind of moral permission on an action” (Sreedhar 13). 
Hobbes' right to self-preserve is a “blameless liberty” and it does not incur any reciprocal 
obligation to respect that right. These are not the kinds of rights that our modern, liberal 
philosophy recognizes. In contemporary parlance, one has a right when other people are obliged 
to respect that right. It would make little sense to talk of the right to vote if the state were also 
within its rights to ignore the vote. While there is an empirical case that the state ignores votes all 
of the time, such ignorance is still in contradiction with our purported rights: not so with the 
concept of permission rights. 
 Sreedhar asks for the “reader's indulgence” on this conceptual point, but the importance 
                                                          
22There is a pedantic point here that will become nonetheless important. Sreedhar's rebellion right is retained in a 
commonwealth. She does not argue the similar point that self-defense is justified when the state reverts to the 
state of nature. The right of self-defense is prior to but also contained within the civil law, for Sreedhar. 
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of permission rights is not merely an argumentative indulgence (Sreedhar 14). These kinds of 
rights demonstrate a radically different idea of crime and punishment than we have today and 
they imply an entirely different pantheon of rights against the state. Sreedhar's argument cannot 
function without exposing the historical transformation of what constitutes a right: “The right of 
self-defense does not impose any duties on anyone else to respect its exercise” (16). To use 
contemporary terms, the right of self-defense is more descriptive than normative. It describes the 
fact that people will naturally defend themselves. A sovereign power that ignores the natural 
behavior of self-defense is digging its own grave. We can identify the cases where resistance to 
the sovereign is descriptively blameless by identifying those cases when it is descriptively 
reasonable to expect people to defend themselves. 
 After we have examined Hobbes' concept of rights, his right of rebellion against his state 
looks less ludicrous. Hobbes' account of resistance is a natural consequence of the functions that 
he attributes to the state. Self-preservation is built into the reason why Hobbes' state exists, and 
self-preservation is inalienable because to alienate that right would contradict the whole point. 
 I have already shown that the reason for Hobbes' state is to ensure the possibility of 
peace. If we are obliged to suffer death silently, we are not assured of our peaceful existence. In 
other words, the contract was either never in force or stopped being in force. This point should 
not be controversial. Contracts can be broken, and Hobbes would have been a poor philosopher 
if he did not account for these cases of contractual frustration. 
 Sreedhar isolates three criteria for determining whether the social contract is in force. The 
first is that contracts require a reasonable expectation of fulfillment. To illustrate by 
counterexample, people cannot contract in the state of nature because the most reasonable 
expectation is that the other party will renege (Sreedhar 42). Since there is no trust, it is 
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unreasonable to expect trust. This is the same question-begging argument that political realists 
use to talk about national security: everyone has every reason to kill everyone else, because no 
one trusts each other, so do not trust anyone yourself. Self-confirming prophecies like this are 
irritating, but are valid: “the premise is that it is unreasonable to expect people to overcome such 
a powerful human urge” to avoid putting themselves in danger (Sreedhar 37). 
 Sreedhar's second criterion is the principle of necessity: “One only transfers those rights 
that are necessary to achieve the purpose of the covenant” (49). Simply, it is not necessary to 
transfer self-defense in order to secure the peace: “The principle seems to be that a right can only 
be retained in the social contract if it can be retained by everyone without a loss of peace” 
(Sreedhar 50). This criterion may actually be too strong. The principle is only contingently 
consistent with the principle of reasonable expectation, which would prohibit the alienation of 
self-defense in almost all cases.23 In other words, if alienating the right to self-defense were 
necessary for forming the state, then the state could exist only if most humans were suicidal. In 
any case, Sreedhar's argument is that, contingently, giving up self-defense is not necessary to 
ensure the peace. The irresistable power of the sovereign ensures the peace for Hobbes. 
 Sreedhar’s most important criterion contains the previous two, and this is the principle of 
fidelity. The principle is that contracts are in force only when they are faithful to their purpose: 
“Since the fundamental purpose of the social contract is the preservation of life, a covenant 
within it not to do what one can to preserve one's life is void” (Sreedhar 48). This principle is 
inextricable from Hobbes' philosophy. We covenant with the sovereign for reasons. If those 
reasons are undermined, then all bets are off. 
                                                          
23Whether the right of self-defense is inalienable at all or inalienable in the social contract is a point of debate. 
Sreedhar's necessity principle argues the latter, and she gives the example of the soldier contract as an occasion 
where you can alienate the right to self-preservation. The point is important only because she has to reply to and 
distinguish herself from Hobbes scholars who argue that total inalienability of self-defense is incoherent with 
Hobbes (34-6). The point is irrelevant to my argument, but explains Sreedhar's motive for the necessity principle. 
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 All of Hobbes' other resistance rights are derived (in accordance with these criteria) as 
descriptive, blameless, tendencies that are natural to humans: “It is manifest, that every Subject 
has Liberty on all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred” (Hobbes 
2.21.13). Things that undermine their own purpose cannot reasonably be transferred. Humans 
will not roll over and die when ordered and anyone who expects otherwise is in for a surprise. 
Hobbes was not so naive in this way. He does not demand anything of citizens other than that 
they give up what rights are necessary to ensure their best interests, as he understands them. 
 Sreedhar's principles are supposed to work together in a Hobbesian fashion to form a 
coherent account of resistance. All the parts build from each other: 
The cases in which obeying would undermine the point of submitting to the sovereign are 
exactly those cases in which the power of the sovereign is not materially reduced by a 
subject's disobedience [….] The beauty of this picture is that there seems to be a perfect 
symmetry between what Hobbesian subjects can reasonably be expected to do and what 
they must do. (Sreedhar 110) 
The faithfully upheld contract, demands nothing more or less than the reasonable alienation of 
rights in exchange for peace. This picture may sound a bit too coherent, but it is a tempting 
argument to accept that is faithful to Hobbes' own systematic style. 
 I can now set up a criterion for when rebellion may be justified on this account of rights. 
Rebellion may be justified when doing so does not disrupt the possibility of peace. Such is 
possible only when there is no peace to disrupt. Far from being a subversion of the contract, 
Hobbes is “required to allow the retention of [resistance] rights because of his commitment to 
uniting enlightened self-interests with political obligation” (Sreedhar 130). To put it simply, if the 
state is contradictory to the purpose of peace, then those who are so affected cannot be blamed 
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for having a go at it themselves. 
 Sreedhar's argument is simple: “[Hobbes] explicitly endorses the following principle: a 
subject has no obligation to obey the soevereign if he judges that the sovereign is not providing 
for his security. If we add a plausible premise [that the sovereign is not providing security] this 
implies a right of rebellion (Sreedhar 139). 
 Hobbes states the moment when obligation to the state ceases: “The obligation of 
Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long and no longer, than the power lasteth, by 
which he is able to protect them” (2.21.21). Sreedhar completes the modus tollens: “If a number 
of subjects suffer lives that are fundamentally insecure or if they have persistent reasons to fear 
violence at the hands of others, then they have no obligation to obey the sovereign” (141). 
Hobbes understands that a sovereign may at least possibly fail at the job of securing the peace. A 
sovereign failure is not inconceivable to him. Because a rebellion cannot destroy what is already 
destroyed by the sovereign, the possibility of a rebellion that does not destroy peace seems true. 
Therefore, a conditional Hobbesian right of rebellion is plausible. 
 The final task is to prove that this criterion for rebellion does not describe an empty set. 
In other words, rebellion must not merely refrain from disrupting the peace, but it must itself 
work toward securing a peace. This is possible only if the state is in contradiction with securing 
peace and that collective, seditious resistance is the most reasonable way to secure peace. To 
make the point totally clear, “[Rebellion] is a question about whether Hobbes' theory of political 
obligation confers a right to conspire with others in order to strip an established sovereign of its 
authority” (Sreedhar 135). There are more specific questions, such as the right to continue rather 
than initiate a rebellion, what specific conditions frustrate a covenant, and so on, but these are 
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secondary questions.24 None of these questions matters without answering whether we have a 
right, not to defend just ourselves, but to conspire with and defend others. 
Echoing this positive half of the argument, Sreedhar concludes: “a subject has the right to 
rebel if and only if that subject judges that the sovereign is not providing adequately for his 
security and that rebellion is the best means to his self-preservation” (137). Given that rebellion 
is almost always more dangerous than even the most self-absorbed sovereigns, insecurity alone is 
insufficient. Rebellion must also be the most reasonable means to preserving one’s life. The rest 
of the book is her pre-emptive defense of this argument, where she accounts for Hobbes' 
arguments against rebellion and tries to make them internally consistent. 
 Martinich has made a point-by point critique of Sreedhar's argument, where he defends 
the absolutist interpretation of Hobbes. Unlike hid disagreement with Cooke, Martinich's 
disagreement with Sreedhar is about the truth of the propositions. His critique is that Sreedhar 
simply does not get at a right of rebellion through the right of self-defense: while Hobbes accepts 
the right of self-defense and the other resistance rights, the chasm between those rights and 
rebellion is too wide for Martinich to accept. (Review of Hobbes on Resistance). Rebellion is 
qualitatively different from all of the other resistance rights in that rebellion is a communal 
activity. Rebellion requires defense of others in common. Sreedhar has an argument for how a 
collective rebellion is individually justified, but Martinich just does not accept the technical 
details of Sreedhar's argument. 
The fact that philosophers disagree about technicalities is no more uncommon than the 
sky being blue. The uncommon point of Martinich's critique is not where he disagrees, but where 
he agrees. Martinich argues from the same theoretical hermeneutic as Sreedhar does. Both of 
them make the argument that their interpretation is closer to what Hobbes actually said and 
                                                          
24Hobbes clearly absolves rebels who continue rebelling once the rebellion is underway (Leviathan 2.21.17). 
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meant. Sreedhar asserts, “The goal of this book is to construct the most plausible and most 
accurate interpretation – i.e., closest to the text – of Hobbes views on resistance” (6). Martinich 
counterattacks, “If the proposition that subjects have a right to rebel had been put to Hobbes, he 
would have denied it” (Review of Hobbes on Resistance). When I previously presented the 
arguments about Hobbes religion we discovered how difficult the question was to answer. 
Similarly, Martinich's and Sreedhar's arguments are totally irreconcilable; just as before, we have 
reached a point of aporia. 
 I have already stated that I do not care about this particular hermeneutic. What Hobbes 
really, truly, intended about rebellion is as irrelevant to this paper as was his truly intended 
religion. So what is the point of this exercise? The point is to prove that Hobbes' ambiguity exists 
in (1) a variety of topics besides religion and (2) in a topic that is not apparently ambiguous and 
(3) in both theoretical and propositional matters. Arguing that Hobbes provides a right of 
rebellion is an even more marginal position than arguing for his orthodox Christianity. 
Nevertheless, these questions result in aporia given the value-suppositions that inform our 
hermeneutics of Hobbes. 
 There are several possibilities to wade through. If one accepts the hermeneutic of getting 
at what Hobbes said and meant, then either Sreedhar or Martinich is right, or Hobbes was 
inconsistent in his philosophy and there is nothing to be right about. Alternatively, it is possible 
that his philosophy contains a set of moral suppositions that the hermeneutic cannot cope with, 
like showing a paradox to a science fiction robot. The limits of the “said and meant” hermenutic 
require that Sreedhar try to make things consistent (Sreedhar 143), but I do not have to worry 
about that question. Even if Hobbes were inconsistently implying the right of rebellion, he would 
still be implying it, and it would be bad science to ignore it. Therefore I will not worry about the 
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possibility that Hobbes is self-contradictory or whether one or the other of these positions is the 
true one. 
 What I will worry about is the degree to which Sreedhar and Martinich overlook the parts 
of Hobbes that are contrary to their politics. They weaponize Hobbes in their interpretations of 
him, and the interesting question is how they have done so. Sreedhar is not ignorant of this 
aspect: 
There is a disagreement about how we ought to understand Hobbes' place in the history 
of political thought. Some see him as a protoliberal, arguing that […] natural liberty and 
equality, individual rights, and government serve to make it a harbinger of modern 
liberalism [….] Others, in sharp contrast, emphasize those aspects of Hobbes' philosophy 
that appear to stand firmly against [liberalism]. (172) 
Accepting her false dichotomy for the moment, Sreedhar is firmly in the first camp. She 
weaponizes Hobbes to support a well-established canon of liberal rights. She has recuperated 
Hobbes' proto-social contract neatly into the tradition of liberal, 18th century political thought.25 
 The only major problems in Sreedhar's argument (both logical and ethical) result from 
this recuperative agendum. The major logical problem is that, while Sreedhar argues that the 
right of rebellion is retained in the social contract, she arrives at rebellion by presupposing the 
lack of force of the social contract. Sreedhar does not want to presuppose such a breakdown; she 
wants that the right of rebellion be a right held by people “in a commonwealth against their 
sovereign” rather than a right held by enemies of the sovereign (156). There is an alternative, 
more consistent description of the right to rebel; that is, the right is not a retention from nature 
but a reversion to nature. That is to say, people have a right to rebel against the sovereign 
                                                          
25
 Recuperation is to bring a dangerous or subversive idea back into impotence and normalcy. We will later see how 
recuperation functions in political institutionas. 
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because a sovereign who provides chaos is not and never was a sovereign at all. 
 This argument—that the right of rebellion is a reversion to nature rather than retained in 
the commonwealth—has been what I have been arguing so far. It has also been what Sreedhar 
has been arguing but has refused to conclude. Her attempts to address this problem are not 
satisfactory and rely mostly on assertion. She asserts: “Hobbes does not seem to understand 
political membership in this way […] The person who is commanded to incriminate himself is 
still a member of society; he just has the right to disobey that particular command. He is not 
permitted to then rob a bank” (Sreedhar 157). In other words, resistance to a particular demand 
by the sovereign does not mean that we are totally removed from the sovereign state. 
 There are several immediate problems here. A basic problem is that her claim does not 
appear true: obligation to a sovereign ceases when the sovereign loses the power to protect its 
state. I have shown this point already, and so has Sreedhar: subjects are obliged, as Hobbes says, 
“no longer than the power lasteth.” A larger problem is that Sreedhar's deduction is not valid. She 
has neglected her previous points of permission and subjective rights. A permission right does 
not incur an obligation to respect it. If you are commanded by the state to incriminate yourself 
(which, by the way, is exactly what a grand jury does today) then on Hobbes' account you are not 
to blame for refusing to testify. This point is true, but let us recall the other half of it: the state is 
also not to blame when it throws you in its murder pits. 
 Hobbes' state is absolute; it can throw you in its murder pits for even more trivial reasons 
than refusing to self-incriminate. This fact factors into the subjective decision to, for example, 
rob a bank if I am commanded to incriminate myself. After all, I might judge that robbing a bank 
is the only way to escape the arm of the law. It might even be permissible for me to rob a bank if 
my only crime is adjusting my waistband. Why? Because I might judge that the state is going to 
59 
execute me for adjusting my waistband, which it empirically sometimes does. If the consequence 
of refusing to self-incriminate is prison, and if the consequence of prison is the loss of life, 
(which prison often entailed and sometimes entails) then I am totally at liberty to do whatever I 
can to save my life. Sreedhar made this point herself, but she does not seem prepared to accept 
the implications of her argument. 
 This problem is not just a logical problem. It is a problem of value. It is an ethical 
problem.  Sreedhar's liberal recuperation of Hobbes causes her to underestimate the ethical 
importance of conclusions that she herself draws: “We find Hobbes' lack of liberal intuitions in 
general distasteful, but he offered subjects certain rights that we do not” (175). For example, 
liberals no longer think that attempting to escape prison is justified – quite the contrary. Citizens 
are coercively disciplined and expected to police themselves; bodily force is used only after 
people fail to behave themselves. Hobbes consistently argues for the right to resist the law, 
including killing police officers in order to escape custody. Today, contrarily, simply going limp 
during an arrest is not only grounds for additional legal punishment but is also condemned on 
moral grounds. Sreedhar does not account for resistance to this first order coercion, because the 
limits of her values provide no tools for such an account. 
 Sreedhar could have easily echoed Jefferson's Declaration in her treatment of Hobbes' 
right of rebellion, that people are entitled to rebel only after “a long train of abuses and 
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute 
Despotism.” What she does say is that “if the sovereign fails to protect so many of his subjects 
that they are moved to rebel, then the blame lies at the door of the sovereign. If a well-
functioning commonwealth dissolves, it will probably not be because of the unjustified 
resistance of the subjects” (167).  I like this point, because it is the logical conclusion of Hobbes' 
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description about human nature; however, the same recuperative agendum prevents Sreedhar 
from recognizing any subversive ethical implication from Hobbes' arguments, just as the 
hermeneutic she shares with Martinich entails a shared aporia in interpreting Hobbes. 
The ethical problem with recuperation is not simply nostalgia or a hermeneutic that limits 
her argument; the problem is that it forces Sreedhar to dull her own blade by casting Hobbes as a 
reminder of liberalism. Sreedhar argues that Hobbes' philosophy sometimes supports rebellion, 
and I would agree, but her theory falls short of explaining why. Whether she is right or wrong 
about Hobbes, she has made use of him in order to support the logically uninteresting theory that 
liberalism has lost its original spark: “What becomes of Hobbes if we come to recognize that we 
are not prepared to allow liberties where he was? Turning our attention to this aspect of Hobbes' 
philosophy renders him less a foil than a mirror in which we may somewhat uncomfortable look 
upon our own (perhaps unjustified) illiberal tendencies” (Sreedhar 175). Her history of liberalism 
can speak about only the presence or loss of the original liberal state. That history cannot speak 
about the transformations in the ethics of the liberal state. 
 Sreedhar is positioned for a coup de gras, and she turns her blade at the last moment. 
Consider the following rewrite of what I just quoted: “What becomes of Hobbes if we come to 
recognize that we are not prepared to allow liberties where he was? Turning our attention to this 
aspect of Hobbes renders him less a foil than a mirror in which we may look upon the 
culmination of our liberal tendencies that outgrew and contradicted their creators.” Hobbes 
could not possibly have predicted what would become of his ideas. A friend of mine put it 
pithily: “Hobbes couldn't even know what a big mac was.” Hobbes could not have understood 
the development of the Westphalian state through and beyond the industrial revolution. The 
development of things like the state and rights have not lost the spark of liberalism as much as 
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developed it into a form contradictory with its origin. 
 I am now prepared to argue that Hobbes' philosophy would mean anarchism today. This 
claim is true in case the function of the state is essentially no longer for securing peace for its 
subjects. There are three elements in that claim to recognize. The first is the action of securing 
peace. The second is the question of whether peace is essential. The third is for whom the peace 
is intended, that is, subjects or someone else. If the nature of the state itself has changed on these 
measures, then a statist Hobbesian is today operating on false premises. Hobbes' dictate of 
obedience is conditional on the fact that the state, where the law is available, essentially secures 
its citizens. 
 The element of peace is not obviously the essential purpose of the state in 2013. In the 
modern state, the militarization of the police, the omni-partisan centralization of power, the 
transformation of prisons from reformatories to unpaid labor camps, the apparently infinite 
technology of surveillance, the ideological monopoly on power, the illegalization of public 
spaces, the privatization of universities and public works, the uncritical acceptance of all of these 
things by public faces, as if they were natural states of affairs, and so on are not obvious 
indications of a state that is attempting to secure the possibility of peace for its subjects. Even 
when the “help” of all this law is “available,” it is not obviously helpful. You do not have to look 
hard to find the chilling trend of police officers systematically murdering people.26 There is not 
an obvious contract between subject and sovereign; rather, there is a contract among the 
representations of the sovereign with itself. 
 You can certainly argue that all of those things are aimed at the possibility of peace, but 
                                                          
26I say and mean murder, not shooting. Atlanta generally faces at least one of these murders every three months. 
They are trivially easy to point out. I doubt that the people subjected to this campaign think that the purpose of 
the law is to secure them. The law, rather non-consensually, rather non-contractually secures itself against its 
citizens, rather than for them. 
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let us not pretend that they obviously are. To do so would be putting an absurd amount of faith in 
the continuity of political science. Being in a state is not even obviously contractual anymore: 
we are thrown into the midst of the so-called “contract” and there are both practical and legal 
obstacles to leaving it. Being stateless is effectively illegal, not that it would do much good when 
all of the land on Earth is the sovereign domain of some state or another. 
Absolutely none of the functions of the contemporary state is obviously directed to 
security, or more precisely, the functions are not obviously directed to the security of citizens. On 
the contrary, the functions of the contemporary state are just as plausibly described as a domestic 
terror campaign with the aims of compliance and discipline through whatever means it chooses. 
The “whatever means” is familiar to Hobbes; the omnipresent, coercive state apparatus that 
polices rather than punishes is not so familiar. Hobbes’ sovereign could do whatever it wanted to 
subjects in a commonwealth. The sovereign could not, however, alter the game of the 
commonwealth and meaningfully remain a sovereign. 
 So in one sense, it is true that all of these functions of the state provide for security. The 
question is security for whom? The answer: security for the nation, rather than the public. The 
state is materially capable of securing itself without providing the security of citizens. This was 
less true in Hobbes' time. This was the whole point: the sovereign emerged from the social 
contract, and the security of the state and the security of the people were purportedly 
inextricable. Today, the state apparatus can secure itself without and in spite of the security of its 
people. If the state has outgrown the material need to secure its people, why would it secure 
them? Out of kindness? 
 I am not going to assert anything further positive about the function of the contemporary 
state. My point is that it is not obvious that the essential function of the state is still peace as 
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Hobbes understood it; indeed, it appears more plausible that the function of the state is no longer 
peace as Hobbes understood it. Why would it be otherwise? The function of every other 
philosophical apparatus has undergone transformation since 1651. To assume that the essential 
function of the state has endured for almost four hundred years would be an uncritical, suspicious 
charity that would never fly in any other science but political economy. 
 But the problem of the transformed state is our problem, not Hobbes'. Hobbes did not 
have to worry about the transformation nor was he able to worry about it. He neither could 
wonder nor had any reason to wonder if his state would change over time. Hobbes was too 
confident in himself and it was natural for him to hold that confidence. We do not have the same 
luxury. Sreedhar's recuperative discourse leads her to identify this worry but prevents her from 
engaging it. Like with Hobbes' “glorious failure” to save religion from its own rigor, Sreedhar is 
participating in the discourse of saving the liberal state from itself. 
 Of course, even if Hobbes would not recognize the function of the contemporary state as 
his own, that does not make Hobbes an anarchist. Martinich is surely correct in saying that 
Hobbes is not an anarchist; however, it is also correct to note the contingent anarchism resulting 
from the evolution of the state that contradicted its genesis. While this does not make Hobbes an 
anarchist, it makes him ambiguous in an even more dangerous and beautiful way than before. He 
does not function only as a useful reference for some political argument or another; he conditions 
the genealogy of political authority and represents several of the moments when the idea of 
authority transforms. Hobbes can be the weapon of even anarchists because the conclusions of 
his ideas are up to the cunning of history. His are admirably, beautifully, incomplete ideas that 
history transforms or rejects. 
 The genesis of an idea may be negated by the development of that idea. Recuperation is 
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the subsequent clean-up job to obfuscate the history of that development. For this particular case, 
the liberal state has altered its objectives, while retaining a semblance of the values of its 
formative moments. The values are still purportedly property, life and liberty, but the meaning 
and application of those values are antithetical to what they were before. The expectation to 
suffer silently in prison is one particular change, but a general change is the degree of confidence 
in politics (and values in general) that was lost soon after Hobbes, and not without good reason. 
Hobbes confidently believed that the absolute government would act in the general interest of the 
people. Can anyone today say the same with such confidence? Certainly no one should. 
 The loss of confidence in matters of value, including the purpose of the sovereign, is part 
in parcel with the loss of the common good. Hobbes' common good was peace. It was 
unequivocally peace. The contemporary state does not have a common good like this. 
Contemporary philosophers other than communitarians rarely talk about one. Contemporary 
liberals do derive ethical principles from something held in common, but in a distorted, negative 
form. The common “good” for the contemporary liberal is the utilitarian imperative to let 
everyone do what they want so long as it does no harm. This sort of imperative does not, 
however, speak to a common good. The utilitarian imperative speaks only to a common wrong. 
The state may, in the name of national security, democracy, pluralism, or whatever, proscribe 
common sets of social and legal opinions, but such a state is incapable of prescribing much at all. 
The form of the state has outlived the need for common morality and replaced it with common 
immorality. 
There is a lot of explaining needed to make sense of the transformation of liberalism into 
its contemporary form. What happened here? How is it that Hobbes' state apparatus could sur-
vive the loss of its moral impetus and even contradict that moral impetus? To answer these ques-
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tions, we need to turn to the history of ethics and consider the differences between how Hobbes 
and a modern liberal conceive of moral inquiry. 
6. WHY TO WEAPONIZE A PHILOSOPHER 
I began this inquiry with “two sets of conflicts” in mind. The first set is simply the 
propositional conflicts in getting our description of history right. They are the conflicts in 
understanding Hobbes’ arguments in relation to his contemporaries like Grotius. They are the 
conflicts that motivate the debates among historians of philosophy like Martinich, Cooke and 
Sreedhar.  They are the conflicts about whether Hobbes is a Christian, atheist, or anarchist. And 
these conflicts have reached their dialectical limits. There is no answering them until we have 
established a common metric of theoretical evaluation, a moral for judging what Hobbes said and 
what his philosophy did. Establishing such a metric is the second set of conflicts that are before 
us, and I have been attempting to demonstrate both how crucial and difficult this task is. The 
aporia resulting from my analysis of several of Hobbes’ projects should make my claim at least 
plausible. 
 The next logical step would appear to be to engage the second set of conflicts, that is, to 
discover what shared values inform our historical investigations. Even more humbly, we might at 
least invent some shared reason for such investigations. Were it only so simple! The second set 
of conflicts at stake in this investigation is not in picking which sort of values we treasure in our 
historical investigations; the second set of conflicts is the conflict over whether there are 
functionally any such values in 2013 and whether there should be. 
Therefore, the purpose of looking at Hobbes' values is not to exercise our comparative 
muscles; it is to expose what he represents in this history of value that has resulted in this sort of 
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value-aporia. Furthermore, things do not represent in a vacuum; they represent for the values of 
the perceiver. I have mentioned this point before, but I shall now codify it explicitly: the most 
striking change in the history of ethics is the loss of our access to the common good. 
Furthermore, it is not just that we contingently avoid our common moral telos, but that the loss 
of confidence in the moral of the commons has made the question itself invalid. 
 It is not my task to catalogue the positive elements and particular changes in this history 
of the distorted common moral.27 I have described some of the particular elements of the change 
in reference to Hobbes, but that is not the main point. The point is to explain these data by 
advancing a theory and to expose the consequences of this loss in our contemporary study of 
philosophy and religion. 
 Alasdair MacIntyre has advanced a theory that begins to explain these data in his moral 
history After Virtue. I do not intend to portray MacIntyre's history as the silver bullet for the 
lycanthropy of moral confusion. His positive project is incomplete and sometimes rings of 
nostalgia. For example, he is ironically the harshest on his potentially closest allies: “The 
Übermensch and Sartrian Existentialist-cum-Marxist belong in the pages of a philosophical 
bestiary rather than a serious discussion.” This said, MacIntyre's critical project, just as he 
describes the Nietzschian and existentialist-Marxist, is at its “philosophically most powerful and 
cogent in the negative part of the critique” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 22). I do not mean to hoist 
MacIntyre by his own petard; the point is that he is addressing the same, enormous problem as 
those Nietzschians and Marxists, and his attempted solution is as vulnerable as theirs are.28 
                                                          
27Not only is such a task beyond the quantitative scope of this investigation, and not only are there plenty of 
genealogical theories to choose from, but I do not think that the point is even controversial. Scholars in 2013 are 
less confident to proclaim general value judgments than their 20th and even 19th century predecessors. 
28For the unslakably curious, MacIntyre's solution is a form of communitarianism. It involves decentralized centers 
of moral inquiry along a positive assertion of traditional, ecclesiastical virtues. He develops this over many 
works. 
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 In other words, I do not buy MacIntyre's solutions to the problems of contemporary moral 
confusion and I have none of my own to propose. MacIntyre is valuable because he has 
recognized the same problematic ambiguities in the history of value that have informed our 
investigation of Hobbes' weaponization. 
 After Virtue begins with a piece of science fiction that describes the loss I have been 
talking about in a clear, intuitive way: 
Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of 
environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists [….] A Know-
Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in 
schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still 
there is a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to 
revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was [….] Nobody, or almost 
nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all. 
(MacIntyre 1) 
MacIntyre's thesis follows quite simply: “In the actual world which we inhabit the language of 
morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary 
world” (2). 
 There are two points that bear on the analysis of Hobbes. The first is that the 
transformation of Hobbes' political absolutism to the modern state is not binary, but at least 
ternary: “[This] history had to be written in [at least] three distinct stages. The first was where 
the [things in question] flourished, the second where they suffered catastrophe and the third 
where they were restored in damaged form” (MacIntyre 3). It is not that Hobbes inherited 
confidence in his values that immediately evaporated after him. Hobbes represents several 
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moments in a history of value transformations that have since themselves transformed: first 
political confidence flourishes, then suffers catastrophe, then is restored in distorted form. I 
demonstrated this in only a few values, and only with one philosopher. Hobbes’ politics and 
religion are merely exceptionally good examples; we could, however, pick any car on the train of 
history and analyze its relation to the common good and common wrong. 
 The second point is that this history of evaluation is itself “not an evaluatively neutral 
chronicle” (MacIntyre 3). To tell a history of the loss of moral functioning is to condemn 
something about contemporary morality. To tell a history about the loss of philosophical 
confidence is also to condemn something about the modern production of knowledge. 
 The next question, then, is what the nature of this loss entails for the modern production 
of knowledge: the loss is not merely a loss of some particular moral maxims; the loss is a 
transcendental loss regarding our ability to converse about value. I showed this before in Hobbes’ 
specific politics. Concerning the moral of the state, we cannot even generally stipulate that the 
telos of society is peace. We can only make one in a plurality of arguments about the state's telos, 
in parity with other candidates such as freedom, equality, class exploitation, guilt, vengeance, or 
whatever. 
 Even this description of the loss is too sanguine, however, because we lack the criteria to 
evaluate what would even count as a telos of society: “The most striking feature of contemporary 
moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking 
feature of [these disagreements] is their interminable character [….] There seems to be no 
rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture” (MacIntyre 6). I have already shown 
the interminability of some issues (religion and rebellion) in interpreting Hobbes' values. 
MacIntyre briefly does the same with abortion, socialism, and just-war theory, but we could 
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demonstrate interminable moral disagreement by picking any contemporary moral issue at 
random and listing the antagonists. This propositional thesis is easy, too easy, to demonstrate. 
What remains to be explained is how we arrived at this state of moral disarray. 
 The rest of After Virtue is to fill in the details of the moral history that is analogous to the 
science fiction at the book's start. It is only one possible version of this tale.29 MacIntyre argues 
that there are “key episodes in the social history which transformed [and displaced] morality” 
and that only through understanding this history can we “understand how the idiosyncrasies of 
everyday moral discourse came to be” (36). MacIntyre's episodes are the same episodes as in 
standard, European history: the heroic period, the classical period, the Christian period, the 
Enlightenment, and the Emotivists. The last of these episodes mark the final (so far) major phase 
in developing the liberal dictum that all is permitted so long as it does not hurt others. I have 
previously called this dictum the “common wrong” in contrast to the common good. 
 MacIntyre's genealogy is a fairly standard story of European history, and will be 
questioned on the same grounds. It describes the transformation of moral ideas within a 
relatively small slice of the world and perhaps places too much explanatory power in the story of 
western philosophy. On the other hand, the cannon and sail lent and lend an enormous amount of 
material power to the story of western philosophy. Western history and World history after 1803 
are inextricable whether we like it or not. In any case, MacIntyre's genealogy, even if too narrow, 
certainly addresses the story I have been telling about Hobbes, and it addresses the problems of 
the dominant political ideology of the present world. 
                                                          
29One of the problems with MacIntyre's theory of history is that he has few tools to argue that we should agree with 
his theory of disagreement. We can have all sorts of interminable meta-disagreements with him even if we accept 
the premise that our contemporary morality is one of interminable disagreement. For example, Marx and 
MacIntyre have incommensurable theories of the loss of moral confidence, and each of them will see the other as 
a symptom of the problem rather than a truly equal critic. For this reason I am concerned only with the parts of 
this theory that explain why it is easy to weaponize philosophers such as Hobbes. 
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 The purpose of a genealogy is not to list a series of events, of course; the purpose is to 
bring to light overlooked aspects in the development of events. That overlooked aspect is this: 
the degradation of moral confidence in history was neither accidental, nor malevolent; it was an 
ironic, tragic result of a series of attempts to save confidence in morality. The loss of common 
moral confidence is not a good thing and was not considered to be a good thing until recently, if 
at all. Such a loss impedes our ability to identify value in the world. All else being equal, it 
would be preferable to have our ethical theses be at least communicable with one another. 
 It was only after the continued failure of people like Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and 
Mill to retain moral confidence, only after the hammer of critique (with sound logic!) pulverized 
this moral bedrock, only after a chain of failed ethical projects, that moral philosophy was 
privatized – privatized, because  the alternative was to abandon moral philosophy entirely. Given 
how good the moral philosophers are at demolishing the arguments of their opponents, there was 
no realm left for moral philosophers to explore. The common wrong was the compromise, the 
peace-treaty, to save the bit of earth that remained unscorched. 
 To use MacIntyre's words, the Enlightenment was an attempt in “justifying morality” that 
“had to fail.” It is not that “Kierkegaard, Kant, Diderot, Hume, Smith [and so on] were not adroit 
enough at constructing arguments,” but that they are the “inheritors” of a moral framework 
“whose internal incoherence ensured the failure of the common philosophical project from the 
outset” in spite of itself (51). The common incoherence that MacIntyre is talking about is the 
attempt to derive a common moral good from human nature alongside the divorce of moral good 
from human nature itself: “Although each [philosopher] attempted in his positive arguments to 
base morality on human nature, each in his negative arguments moved [more and more toward 
the claim] that no valid argument can move from entirely factual premises to any moral or 
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evaluative conclusion” (56). ‘Is’ was divorced from ‘ought’ even in the attempt to derive the 
‘ought’ from the ‘is.’ 
 What followed were arguments to account for the ‘ought’ without appeal to ‘is,’ whether 
that was Kant's categorical imperative or Mill's rule utility. These arguments, however, came 
with a price: “Each moral agent now spoke unconstrained by the externalities of divine law, 
natural teleology or hierarchical authority, but why should anyone else now listen to him? It 
[was] this question that both utilitarianism and analytical moral philosophy must be understood 
as attempting to answer [and] it is precisely this question which both fail to answer cogently” 
(68). The price for freedom in moral inquiry was the lack of a common purpose for moral 
inquiry. 
 Hobbes never had to pay that price. He is early enough in the history that he never had to 
question whether human nature entailed a politics, and he certainly never had to question 
whether human nature was valid in the first place! At the same time, Hobbes comes late enough 
in this history of ethics that he can sincerely attempt to construct political science as a natural 
science. Hobbes' transitionary moral location allowed him to say without a shred of irony that his 
political deductions from human nature could ensure an eternally peaceful society. 
 Once we have seen the diminution of confidence through this history of philosophy, we 
can begin to understand why Hobbes is weaponized in many interminable moral arguments, even 
against himself. I have made this point already, but there is a new implication at this point: 
Hobbes is not by happenstance the enemy of everyone's enemy; he is the enemy of everyone's 
enemy because he is conducive to our purposes. Our contemporary value theories (including 
politics) are exercises in disagreement. Without some common moral to direct our interpretive 
purpose, an ambiguous figure like Hobbes can be interpreted only in limited quantities lest he 
72 
reveal the embarrassing, background, moral disagreements. To put it another way, Hobbes is 
doomed to weapon-status because unless one is willing to sincerely consider and judge his 
axiological significance—not only whether peace is the highest good but whether there is a 
highest good for people—then he is useless for anything besides undermining the arguments of 
your opponents. 
 Fortunately for Hobbes' legacy, demolishing the arguments of one's opponents is 
presently in high demand. I have spent some time describing the permutations of Hobbes' 
potential as a weapon: I have examined some of the battlefields he inhabits, who the combatants 
are, and how he is used in those arenas, but I have said little about weaponization in general. The 
purpose and existence of a weapon is determined by the objectives of its user. For example, the 
weaponized purpose of a bat is to beat someone, but the existence of a bat as a weapon is also 
contingent on the need to bludgeon. A bat is not a weapon when you need to play baseball. 
 I have claimed that Hobbes is a good weapon because of his historical ambiguity, but that 
does not necessarily make a good weapon of him. Historical ambiguity is a useful weapon given 
the ambiguous status of moral confidence in our own society. It is specifically in a liberal, 
bourgeois setting, which values private liberty rather than critical consensus, where an 
ambiguous figure like Hobbes is the most divisive and therefore the most valuable as a weapon. 
Being the enemy of one's enemy can make you either a weapon or a fair-weather ally. Hobbes 
can be a fair-weather ally to Arminians, royalists, and 18th century liberals, but he is a weapon to 
people like Martinich, Cooke, Sreedhar, and myself. The former groups uses him in a game of 
high-stakes baseball about the truth of his ideas. We use him to bludgeon enemies in a war about 
his significance. 
  The difference lies in the supposed moral agreement versus the lack of moral agreement 
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in the conversations relevant to the interpreter. Hobbes is always politically dangerous, but the 
significance of being politically dangerous varies. He is either a politically dangerous 
conversation partner or a politically dangerous piece of data. I have certainly not engaged 
Hobbes as a conversation partner; in fact I agree with MacIntyre in claiming that our moral 
alienation makes doing so impossible. What I have done is shown that Hobbes is a dangerous 
weapon not only in religious or political battles, but that he is dangerous to a liberal world-view 
that cannot appreciate him as anything but a weapon. Where moral confidence is a spectre of the 
past, identifying the existence of moral confidence provides a house for that wraith to haunt. 
 I am not saying that the lack of moral confidence precipitates a lack of moral discussion. 
On the contrary, we should expect to see many competing moral inquires. The lack of confidence 
just precipitates a common supposition of the common wrong.  On the side of the common 
wrong, we have deontologists, utilitarians, intuitionists, emotivists, nihilists, objectivists, 
capitalists, and so on. There also remains a small field for renouncers of the common wrong, 
though they have certainly not reconstructed a common good to satisfaction.30 In any case, the 
logical limitations on the construction of the common good are powerful, but not necessarily 
insurmountable. There is at least the logical possibility of discussing the question of the common 
good. That said, the logical limitations are not the immediate set of limitations that we confront. 
The limitations immediately before us are the political and moral limitations that 
undermine the construction of a common good before it can begin. The question is whether any 
meaningful resolution of moral theory is possible given the institutionalized loss of moral 
confidence that characterizes the humanities in the liberal, corporate university. Our ethical 
                                                          
30MacIntyre's taxonomy of these renouncer theories is the subtitle of his third book: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition. He considers this taxonomy to be exhaustive. While I think that we can conceive of more versions of 
moral inquiry than these, these three are all attempts to account for morality after the loss of confidence was 
obvious and these attempts do not accept the liberal permission of limitless disagreement. 
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disagreements are, indeed, sometimes the results of the logical contradictions among our moral 
theories. MacIntyre points out an additional cause of disagreement in his third book Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry: “What appears to be an impasse resulting from the theoretical 
commitments of those involved in debate may sometimes, in part at least, be one brought about 
by institutional arrangements and social habits” (MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions 6). 
 In other words, what appears to be an ineradicable disagreement between theories may 
appear as such because it is politically inexpedient to solve it in the institutions that produce 
knowledge, “as is the case in the university today” (MacIntyre 6). In other words, even if one 
holds hope for a possible future of common moral inquiry, the actual arrangements of knowledge 
production may not ground such hopes. 
 This is a bold, but not unmerited, accusation. Where knowledge of common wrong has 
done away with knowledge of the common good, there is no need whatsoever to sponsor the 
inquiry into a common good: 
Nothing is more striking in the contemporary university than the extent of the apparently 
ineliminable divisions and conflicts within all humanistic enquiry. In psychology 
psychoanalysts, Skinnerian behaviourists, and cognitive theorists are as far from 
resolving their difference as ever. In political enquiry Straussians, Neo-Marxists, and 
anti-ideological empiricists are at least as deeply antagonistic. In literary theory and 
history deconstructionists, historicists, heirs of I.A. Richardson and readers of Harold 
Bloom similarly contend. (MacIntyre 6) 
Why should it be otherwise? The value of the common wrong is the personal expression of one's 
values and the assurance of being unmolested in expressing them. Nothing affords the promise of 
personal inquiry into a topic of one's choice like the liberal university. The price of this promise, 
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however, was that “moral and theological truth ceased to be recognized as objects of substantive 
enquiry and instead were relegated to the realm of privatized belief” (MacIntyre 217). 
 To emphasize, the loss of confidence was a price, not a plot. The liberal university was a 
nobly motivated attempt to include as valid objects of inquiry those things that were not 
approved by authority, to end the forced exclusion of atheists, Jews, Aristotelians, and so on. Just 
as with Hobbes' scientific theology, however, this attempt to free the university contained the 
seeds of its own negation. The problem was that the freer pursuit of knowledge was the 
fragmentation of the production of knowledge: 
Liberalism […] appealed to two sets of premises, one true and one false. The true 
premises concerned those [exclusory] injustices to individuals of which the pre-liberal 
university was certainly guilty. The false premises propounded the thesis that human 
rationality is such [that] if freed from external constraints imposed by religious and moral 
tests, it will produce both progress and agreement among all rational persons. (MacIntyre 
225) 
Natural science thrives under such an environment due to the “quiet, informal, unstated” 
exclusions that they retain as a privilege for reliably revolutionizing the technology of the state. 
Other areas must either mimic the technical acumen of the natural sciences (as in social sciences) 
or allow totally unconstrained disagreement (as in literary criticism.) Philosophy takes both 
routes, with analytic and continental camps routinely excommunicating one another. 
 All of these consequences are unfortunate enough sacrifices in the specialization of 
academic disciplines, but the common good suffers the most damage. Questions of morality are 
all but eliminated because moral theories “cannot accept the indifference presupposed by such 
tolerance” of the limitless disagreements permitted in the humanities (MacIntyre 225). In the 
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modern university, moral inquiry means challenging a class of students either to push a fat man 
in front of a train to save five other men or not to push him. Even saying, “YES! Push that man 
onto the tracks!” is antithetical to the “free” pursuit of knowledge by the student. In this way, the 
liberal university carries on its ironic, exclusory campaign. 
 Of course the liberal university cannot exclude inquiry in the same way as its 
predecessors did. The liberal university “achieve[s] this exclusion not by formally placing the 
excluded doctrine under a ban or prohibition, but by admitting it only in reduced or distorted 
versions, so that it unavoidably becomes an ineffective contender for intellectual and moral 
allegiance” (MacIntyre 219). We saw this process at work before in Sreedhar's attempt to 
recuperate Hobbes' conditional anarchism into the history of liberal rights. 
 One of the most chilling examples of this exclusion-by-distortion is the recuperation of 
Nietzsche's genealogical critique of Protestant, liberal ethics.31 Nietzsche is one of MacIntyre's 
exemplars, who provides one alternative to the common wrong, and Nietzsche had nothing but 
scorn for the mendacity of the liberal university. Nonetheless, “genealogists now occupy 
professional chairs with an ease which might have [certainly would have!] discomfited 
Nietzsche.” It is permitted to love the aphorism, permitted to say (as Nietzsche sometimes did) 
that the scientific university is a house of life-denying guilt, permitted to argue that the form of 
the university must change, so long as those arguments are “expressed in conventional academic 
journal articles and lectures” (MacIntyre 218). 
 Furthermore, MacIntyre points out that recuperation is “not merely a problem for the 
genealogist.” Anyone who considers the genealogical critique to be a legitimate challenge to the 
                                                          
31In brief summary: Christian morals are motivated by the promise of vengeance against those who were stronger at 
them in life, and this association of the good with weakness survives the death of the church and permeates 
liberalism. I have no intention of arguing for or against that perspective, but it is an extremely substantial ethical 
challenge to the limitless disagreement allowed by liberal tolerance. 
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“whole conventional academic mode” faces the dilemma of either rejecting the university or 
being recuperated by it (220). In other words, being anti-liberal does not entail being pro-
Nietzschean. Indeed, this is the entire logical problem beneath the institutional problem: the loss 
of a common moral is a real loss. It is a loss even for people who commonly renounce the 
common wrong. 
The Thomist is one such alternative renouncer. The Thomist is MacIntyre's alternative to 
the Nietzschian, and the Thomist is at as much risk of recuperation as the genealogist. Both the 
Thomist and the Nietzschien are in a sort of transcendental solidarity: while they are at odds in 
almost every positive thesis, they recognize that common moral confidence has disappeared from 
public life and that nothing like it has since come to take its place. As I stated before, the 
philosophical disagreements between the Thomist and Nietzschean may be possible to solve, or 
they may not be. 
The problem is that the Thomist and the Nietzschean are not even in a position to work 
out their philosophical disagreements. The point is that, in the university, any debate about some 
common moral telos, whether one is upholding a moral tradition or destroying it, must be 
performed either in the distorted, reduced mood of moral uncertainty or not performed at all. 
 We are finally in a position to understand the obstacles to addressing the second order 
conflicts, which lie subterranean to the conflicts of Hobbes’ religion and politics. The first 
obstacle is that the institutions of knowledge (re)production are rarely interested in solving this 
set of conflicts. Such a lack of interest is coherent with the pluralistic, inclusive motives involved 
in the evolution of the university. The university is pleased to encourage the investigation of first 
order conflicts. It is pleased to question Hobbes’ religion. It is even pleased to allow a person’s 
expression of religion in the argument about Hobbes’ religion. The university remains, however, 
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ill-equipped to judge such investigations. 
More accurately, it is not the university that encourages or fails to judge; the university is 
not the type of thing that has the agency to judge or refrain from judgment. Stated accurately, the 
first obstacle to answering the second set of conflicts is that the university must limit the 
discursive space available for questions about value. It must limit (rather than does limit) 
because such a limitation is part of the price of the freer pursuit of knowledge. For example, if 
the university were to take one version of Christianity as dogmatic, then the question of Hobbes’ 
religion would be entirely fixed upon the axioms involved. It would not even meaningfully be a 
question, but rather an undiscovered statement. The benefit of the university is that Hobbes’ 
religion is not determined prior to investigation. The detriment of the university is that Hobbes’ 
religion is indeterminable even after investigation. 
The first obstacle is not the most terrifying one, however. The first obstacle is just that the 
modern university encourages a value of pluralism, the concept of which contains a contradiction 
or two. The first obstacle is nothing more than the fact that actions sometimes have contradictory 
effects. The first obstacle is no more unfamiliar to life than the ocean being salty. The truly 
vicious obstacle is in the case where scholars do share some semblance of a common value. Even 
when scholars agree on some common purpose (e.g. getting at what Hobbes “said and meant,”) 
the aporia of liberalism remains tenacious. This is the case with every single interpretation of 
Hobbes that I have heretofore presented. Martinich, Sreedhar and Cooke share a common value 
of figuring out what Hobbes really meant to argue. They totally fail to resolve even the most 
basic questions about what Hobbes really meant to argue. 
 The second obstacle to these second order conflicts is that, even when we want to devise 
a common academic purpose, we no longer seem capable of the confidence necessary to do so. 
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This failure is evident even in the criticisms of the university and even in my own argument. The 
Thomist and the Nietzschien may share a transcendental solidarity, and we are grateful for it. 
That said, the reverse of the medal is the depressing, abject failure of our attempts to banish the 
devil of uncertainty. We have no way to determine what rite would even be effective to banish it. 
It is possible that no such rite exists. This is the terrifying obstacle. 
There is a deliciously recursive irony to this history of moral philosophy. The problems 
for our investigations of Hobbes are partly inaugurated by Hobbes himself, and they are 
inaugurated totally contrary to Hobbes’ wishes. Hobbes' confidence in the legacy of scientific 
rationalism was second only to his confidence in himself. We would have to pity poor Hobbes, 
were he still alive, for his confidence could not stand against the subsequent cunning of history. 
It must not be forgotten that Hobbes, though an excellent example, is still one example of 
many. Beyond Hobbes, we can generate plenty of examples of theories that are either not politi-
cally viable studies or viable only in distorted forms. Freud is an excellent example, though he is 
excluded less by the liberal drive to tolerate disagreement and more by the fetishization of the 
politically useful techniques that characterize post-positivist, social sciences. Let us also not for-
get the poor Marxist professor, whose life purpose of appropriating the production of ideology is 
in blatant contradiction with the institutional exploitation of their labor and theft of their work. 
To tell the story of institutional recuperation and transformation will eventually require an ex-
haustive genealogy. 
7. SPOILS OF VICTORY 
Since I have yet to complete this exhaustive genealogy, my purpose here has been 
twofold: to expose the aporia of the interpretive conflicts that result in Hobbes’ weaponization 
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and to isolate the set of conflicts that explain the aporia of those interpretive conflicts. One 
consequence of the history of these conflicts is the loss of common moral confidence in our 
academic circles. This loss encourages us to weaponize moral confidence rather than be morally 
confident. The fact that weaponization is characteristic of our moral investigations is not 
problematic by itself. By itself, weaponization may have just been another chapter in the story of 
the common good. The problem arises when weaponization is conjoined with the loss of 
confidence in a common struggle. The problem is when there are no good battles to fight with 
those weapons. More precisely, the problem arises when we have no tools to figure out what a 
good battle would even be. 
Do not misunderstand. When I speak of having a good battle in common, I am not 
speaking of the same inclusive pluralism that I have criticized. I am not fantasizing that 
subjugated peoples and repressed classes may work towards some pluralistic dialogue with their 
oppressors. To speak of “our” battle is to include only a particular “our.” We are speaking of 
those who are oppressed and coerced by the power of the university. We are speaking more 
precisely to those who will not have their hunger for education sated by a meager, recuperative 
bone that the capitalist may deign to throw us. We are speaking of those who will not accept the 
hierarchy of instruction and those who will not accept the commodification of their work. 
If a reader asked at this point, “So who, positively, are you talking about? Am I in this 
class or not?” then I would give the frustrating answer to figure it out yourself. Given my 
argument, I cannot provide a positive definition of what this “our” is.32 The common wrong has 
limited us to defining ourselves negatively against the state and against the capitalist. Few people 
                                                          
32
 That all said, we can give signs in lieu of a definition. If you believe that students should adapt to a curriculum 
rather than develop it, if you believe that the purpose of education is to produce a healthy workforce, if you 
believe that students should ever pay for access to your privileged monopoly on information, if you believe that 
education is legitimized by the state, then you are the oppressor. 
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want to be in the class of oppressor, and fewer would admit it. The veil of the common wrong 
makes it hard to deny someone’s purported resistance.33 That is no problem by itself, because 
then we just have a diversity of resistance. The problem arises when this purely negative 
resistance is conjoined with the recuperative ability of the oppressor. The oppressor locates the 
most useful instance of resistance, repurposes it, and erases the other instances. This was the 
same problem that we saw earlier in the university’s inclusive exclusion. Our lack of confident 
access to a battlefield combined with the limits of the common wrong leaves us vulnerable to 
recuperation. 
 The question is whether we are necessarily vulnerable. As I mentioned before, there are 
both logical and institutional obstacles to the common good. It may be true that common 
confidence is strongly, logically impossible. But because the institutional obstacles occlude our 
vision of the logical ones, the logical disagreements are unanswerable before first addressing the 
institutional ones. For now, the question is whether the liberal university could provide arenas of 
struggle against oppression that are also not vulnerable to recuperation. 
 One reason to hold some hope for the university is that these problems I am talking about 
are not new ones. Even though the beast of the liberal university outgrew the leash of its purpose, 
the beast of engenders calls for its own reform. In other words, the climate of disagreement 
results in disagreement with the climate of disagreement. When it is working at its best, the 
machinery of the university, like the machinery of science, improves on itself each time it is 
wrong. Indeed, the machinery will improve itself only through being wrong. Being wrong 
                                                          
33
 I am speaking here of genuine efforts to resist oppression in good faith that are susceptible to the tragedy of 
recuperation. I am speaking of the cases where people’s subjective desire to resist oppression does not 
necessarily match the objective function of their behavior. I am not speaking of the mendacious efforts of the 
state and economic apparatuses, of the universities, of the police, of the courts, and so on, to delude and seduce 
people into oppression with a human face. I am not speaking of any reform that merely absorbs more people into 
the ranks of the oppressor. 
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becomes a weapon. Furthermore, the tragedy of recuperation has been recognized plenty of times 
already. The entire idea of area studies and the entire business of post-modernism are (at their 
best) attempts to carve a place of resistance to the capitalist rule of education. Many people have 
attempted to wrest control of the apparatus from the state. 
 One reason to abandon all hope for the university is that these problems I am talking 
about are not new ones. If the process of reformation is itself included in the calculations of the 
oppressor, then simple negations will be invariably assimilated. To put it another way, the 
machinery of the weapon improves, but improves for whom? The weapon improves for its 
wielder. Indeed, this is the whole problem. Let us assume the controversial premise, just for the 
sake of argument, that we were once the wielders of the university.  
Let us assume that all of the 20th century inclusivism and pedagogy and post-modernism 
and recursive, self-referential Marxism were in good faith and were at one point dangerous and 
subversive weapons. I am quite willing to stipulate all of these general intentions to the self-
reforming university; however, the present reality is that, we wield this weapon no longer. 
Universities are corporate ventures with business models. They exist to reproduce the skills and 
ideologies necessary for productive and reproductive labor. There are good reasons to think that 
this has always been the nature of the school, but even given our stipulation otherwise, the value 
of the 2013 university is certainly economic and not pedagogical.  
Faced with these facts, we may either wrest the weapon from its wielder or try to find 
other weapons. The past history of resistance to the institution has generally opted for the former, 
of seizing control of the weapon. 
If the weapon could be retaken, then I would not be opposed to doing so. Surely such a 
recapture is logically possible. There is no a priori obstacle to doing so; however, all the attempts 
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so far to seize control of the weapon have failed. Why do I say that they have failed? I could go 
through a history of examples and point out the particular recuperations of particular struggles, 
but I will put it more simply and brutally: capital and state oppression are thriving. If the 
intentions of the liberal university were to destroy such things, then both I as well as science 
demand a counter-explanation of the persistence and health of capital. The a posteriori obstacle 
to shattering the institutional limitations is that there can be no partial success. There can be no 
individual steps on the road to a liberated educational system. Resistance to the institution by 
means of seizure must proceed absolutely or else the virus of capitalism will re-infect the body of 
the university and then mutate into an even more deadly virus. 
I am not saying that this more traditional notion of seizing control is impossible, but that 
it is hard. I am not saying that this more traditional notion should not be pursued and planned for, 
but that its conditions for success are high. I am also not saying that resistors should isolate into 
camps and snipe at one another. I am saying that we need to consider different methodological 
weapons. Because looking at the future is impossible, and because the weapons of the 20th 
resistance have either failed or been stolen from us, I have tried to look at some of the weapons 
of the past. I have tried to salvage an old arsenal for a contemporary war. 
The idea of salvaging old propositions and theories for new conflicts should sound 
familiar by now, because that is what Hobbes did himself. To the religionist, Hobbes salvaged 
the old propositions of Christianity and used new scientific theory. To the secularist, Hobbes 
used Christianity as a theoretical tool to ground his political propositions. However you slice it, 
Hobbes explained and proposed things in strange, dangerous ways. Do not misunderstand. The 
values and battlefields of the 17th century are not and should not be the same ends of us who 
decry oppression; however, the existences of those conflicts are valuable reminders that our 
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current situation is relatively new. 
Recuperation is a clean-up job; it is a strategy of making people forget and distort a 
history. Recuperation is the attempt to make a contingent fact appear to be a necessary law. 
Recuperation encourages people to believe absurd and false things, for examples, that capitalism 
has existed since Babylon, that there have always been nation-states, that school has always been 
in the “public” sphere, or that the “public” sphere has always included the state. Orwell 
illustrated this perfectly in seven words, “We’ve always been at war with Eurasia.” 
Hobbes is a reminder that none of those apparently eternal truths is true. We should think 
of other reminders that other things are also not true. The development of state capital and 
neoliberal pluralism are historically located and historically vulnerable. They are not 
unapproachable machines; they operate according to their own logic and they betray the traces of 
the history that conditioned them. There was something before them; there could be something 
after them. 
The point is to resist without being recuperated. If we want to learn how to do that, then 
we should probably look at theories and people that have proven difficult to recuperate. We must 
be able to isolate the dangerous ambiguities contained in our theories of value, and I have tried to 
do that with Hobbes. I have tried to isolate Hobbes’ dangerous ambiguity at two levels of 
conflicts: the historical conflicts and the interpretive conflicts. Recall the distinction between 
disagreement about propositions and disagreements about theoretical explanations. Hobbes was a 
statist but for totally different reasons than a modern statist is; he was a statist-anarchist. Hobbes 
was a Christian but for totally different reasons than many Christians are; he was a Christian-
naturalist. 
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In order to oppose oppressive institutional apparatuses like the contemporary university, 
we must be able to distinguish and weaponize the various theoretical explanations for its exist-
ence. We need not necessarily have a ready-at-hand program or alternative idea of how to man-
age the apparatus.  Such programs have proven vulnerable to recuperation. We should, however, 
attempt to cultivate the possibility of alternatives, and that means cultivating our minds such that 
we are not deluded by recuperative fables. We should also promote ambiguity in a way that re-
sists recuperation. If we are able to tell the story of what liberal education was itself the alterna-
tive to, then we are better equipped to produce alternatives ourselves. 
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